An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington\u27s Public Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence by Lutzenhiser, Jeanine Blackett
Washington Law Review 
Volume 87 Number 4 
12-1-2012 
An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington's Public Trial and 
Public Access Jurisprudence 
Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeanine B. Lutzenhiser, Comment, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington's Public Trial and 
Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 1203 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol87/iss4/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
09 - Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012 7:39 PM 
 
1203 
AN OPEN COURTS CHECKLIST: CLARIFYING 
WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC TRIAL AND PUBLIC ACCESS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser 
Author’s Note: As this issue went to press, the Washington State Supreme Court decided 
four cases involving the right to public trial and the open administration of justice: In re 
Personal Restraint of Morris, State v. Sublett, State v. Paumier, and State v. Wise. The 
fourteen separate opinions in these cases demonstrate that the Court is far from agreement, 
and that important questions regarding Washington’s open courts jurisprudence remain 
unanswered. In short, the decisions do not appear to definitively resolve the dilemmas that 
this Comment attempts to address and that trial courts still face. A response to these decisions 
in the June 2013 issue of this publication will more closely examine their impact on 
Washington open courts jurisprudence. 
Abstract: Fundamental to the American system of justice is the right to a public trial and 
a general presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. These values are reflected in the 
First and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and in many state 
constitutions. Washington is one of a number of states whose constitution (unlike the U.S. 
Constitution) also explicitly guarantees the open administration of justice. Constitutional 
dilemmas arise when a party requests the closure of a courtroom or the sealing of documents. 
These requests force courts to harmonize values of open justice with other compelling 
interests. U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia and 
Waller v. Georgia have provided guidance to states developing their own public trial 
jurisprudence. The Washington State Supreme Court used U.S. Supreme Court decisions to 
develop its own five-factor test for determining the constitutionality of closed proceedings in 
the criminal context in State v. Bone-Club. Since Bone-Club, however, many trial courts have 
failed to apply the factors articulated by the Court. This has resulted in many costly, high-
profile reversals of convictions because of public trial violations. What could make the Bone-
Club factors clearer and more practical for trial courts? This Comment argues that the Bone-
Club test should become an “open courts checklist” that begins with a threshold question: Is 
the proposed action in fact a closure? If the answer is no, the rights to public access and 
public trial are not implicated. If the answer is yes, there remain six questions a trial court 
must ask on the record to evaluate the constitutionality of a proposed closure. Checklists 
have been employed in the fields of aviation and medicine for decades to ensure safety and 
procedural integrity. In a judicial context, an open courts checklist can provide clear, 
workable standards that will assist trial courts and leave a clear record for review. The goal is 
both improved judicial economy and the safeguarding of these essential constitutional rights 
and values. 
                                                     
 In re Personal Restraint of Morris, No. 84929-3 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. Paumier, No. 
84585-9 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. Sublett, No. 84856-4 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. 
Wise, No. 82802-4 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Publicity . . . is the soul of justice.1 
—Jeremy Bentham 
 
Since even before the founding of the United States, there has been a 
presumption of openness in the American administration of justice. 
According to the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a criminal 
defendant enjoys the right to a public trial, which safeguards the 
defendant’s civil rights and helps ensure the integrity of the justice 
system.2 The First Amendment guarantees, among other rights, the rights 
of free speech, press, and assembly.3 Throughout the nation’s history, 
the freedoms of speech and assembly have also been understood to 
encompass the right to listen and be present at important government 
functions such as trials.4 Twenty-seven state governments,5 including 
Washington’s, have emphasized this value of openness in their state 
constitutions by including provisions to the effect that “[j]ustice in all 
cases shall be administered openly.”6 
One of the thorniest constitutional challenges criminal defendants and 
civil litigants raise at trial and on appeal is the issue of courtroom 
closure.7 In Washington, the Supreme Court continues to struggle with 
fundamental questions: What constitutes a closure?8 What interests and 
whose rights are implicated, and whose will control?9 If rights have been 
violated, what is an appropriate remedy?10 
The Washington State Supreme Court has used decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court as a guide to evaluate alleged violations of the rights to 
public trial and open administration of justice. In 1995 the Washington 
State Supreme Court first articulated a test for courtroom closures in the 
                                                     
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 67 (1825). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). 
5. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS 
AND DEFENSES app. 6 at 6-91, 6-92 (4th ed. 2006) (citing and comparing state constitutional 
provisions). 
6. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
7. See generally Daniel Levitas, Comment, Scaling Waller: How Courts Have Eroded the Sixth 
Amendment Public Trial Right, 59 EMORY L.J. 493 (2009) (surveying the history of the public trial 
guarantee and arguing for corrective measures to prevent improper courtroom closures). 
8. See State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 92–93, 257 P.3d 624, 628 (2011). 
9. See State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 227–29, 217 P.3d 310, 314–15 (2009). 
10. See State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 156, 217 P.3d 321, 329 (2009). 
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criminal context in State v. Bone-Club.11 Since then, however, trial 
courts have often failed to apply the test and have improperly closed 
court proceedings or sealed court documents.12 In the wake of a number 
of high-profile and costly reversals for public trial violations, 
Washington trial courts are asking practical questions: What are judges 
permitted to do in chambers or at sidebar?13 How are they to balance 
abstract constitutional questions with concrete concerns such as privacy 
or limited space, time, and resources?14 
This Comment argues that the Washington State Supreme Court 
should turn the Bone-Club factors into a checklist, much as pilots and 
surgeons use checklists to ensure the safety and integrity of their 
operating procedures.15 This clarified checklist will give trial courts the 
guidance they need to evaluate closure and sealing requests. Part I 
briefly surveys the history of the rights to public trial and open 
administration of justice. Part II examines decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court interpreting these rights in the federal context. Part III details the 
development of open courts jurisprudence in Washington State. Part IV 
describes the current situation in Washington: numerous reversals in the 
courts of appeals and the Washington State Supreme Court because of 
persistent uncertainty about what constitutes a closure. Part V proposes 
an “open courts checklist.” Asking a threshold question of whether the 
contemplated action constitutes a closure will enable courts to decide 
whether a modified Bone-Club test is called for. These preliminary steps 
will also dictate the appropriate remedy for any violation. This process 
will safeguard constitutional rights and values, increase clarity and 
judicial economy, and address the practical concerns of trial courts 
around the state. 
I.  THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS 
GUARANTEE THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC TRIAL AND OPEN 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The open administration of justice implicates two sets of interests. 
                                                     
11. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). 
12. Brief for Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at app. A, State v. Paumier, 155 Wash. App. 673, 230 P.3d 212 (2010) (No. 84585-9) 
(collecting cases). 
13. See State v. Koss, 158 Wash. App. 8, 16, 241 P.3d 415, 418 (2010); see also State v. Smith, 
No. 38868-5-II, slip. op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011).  
14. See In re Detention of Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 386, 246 P.3d 550, 556 (2011). 
15. See generally ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 
(2010) (discussing the efficacy of simple checklists as fail-safe measures in a variety of contexts). 
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The First Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington 
Constitution guarantee the right of the public to openly administered 
justice. The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 22 of the 
Washington Constitution guarantee the right of the accused to a public 
trial. Many open courts cases involve uncertainty or conflict about 
whose interests are at stake—the public’s or the defendant’s—and 
whose interests will ultimately control. 
A.  The First Amendment and Article I of the Washington Constitution 
Guarantee the Right of the Public and Press to Attend Trial 
Proceedings 
By the time the United States was founded, criminal trials in the 
Anglo-American justice system had long had a presumption of 
openness.16 This understanding can be traced to Magna Carta Chapter 
40, as interpreted by Sir Edward Coke’s Second Institute.17 The drafters 
of the Magna Carta likely intended Chapter 40 to restore the integrity of 
the courts by prohibiting the sale of writs.18 Coke, as well as American 
colonial lawyers a century later, reimagined Chapter 40 as addressing 
the more modern threat to an independent judiciary posed by improper 
political pressure.19 What English courts called “one of the essential 
qualities of a court of justice”20 was also a characteristic of the earliest 
American colonial justice systems.21 The Bill of Rights reflects this 
                                                     
16. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). 
17. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of 
State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1995) (citing David Schuman, The Right to a 
Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1199–200 (1992)). Magna Carta Chapter 40 reads in pertinent 
part: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.” WILLIAM SHARP 
MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d 
ed. 1914) (cited in Hoffman, supra, at 1286). Coke stated: 
[E]very subject of this realme, for injury done to him in [goods, land or person], by any other 
subject, be he ecclesiastical, or temporall, free or bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he 
outlawed, excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take his remedy by the course 
of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully 
without any deniall, and speedily without delay. 
1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (W. 
Clarke and Sons 1817) (1642). 
18. MCKECHNIE, supra note 17, at 395 (cited in Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1286). 
19. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 1296–99.  
20. Daubney v. Cooper, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 438 (K.B.) 440; 10 B. & C. 237, 240 (cited in 
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 566). 
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567–68 (describing seventeenth-century framing 
documents from West New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and writings adopted by the First Continental 
Congress in 1774). 
09 - Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:39 PM 
2012] AN OPEN COURTS CHECKLIST 1207 
 
long-standing presumption of openness.22 
Nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham further contributed 
to the theoretical foundation of today’s presumption of openness. 
Bentham discussed a number of benefits of open proceedings, including 
enhanced performance of all participants, protection of judges from 
accusations of dishonesty, and education of the public.23 Bentham saw 
open administration of justice as paramount: 
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in 
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. 
Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present 
themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate 
rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only 
in appearance.24 
Open access for the public and press to judicial proceedings is 
generally understood to be guaranteed by the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.25 The freedoms of speech, the press, the right of 
assembly, and the right to petition the government “share a common 
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating 
to the functioning of government.”26 The freedom to speak carries with it 
the freedom to listen.27 The U.S. Supreme Court has at various times 
referred to a “First Amendment right to receive information and ideas,”28 
and has held explicitly that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit 
in the guarantees of the First Amendment.”29 The Court has recognized 
the “fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done,”30 and observed 
that the criminal justice system must “satisfy the appearance of justice” 
to work effectively.31 The appearance of justice is best satisfied by 
                                                     
22. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
23. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522–25 (1827). 
24. Id. at 524. 
25. See supra note 22. 
26. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
27. Id. at 576.  
28. Id. (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
29. Id. at 580. “The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning what takes 
place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be 
foreclosed arbitrarily.” Id. at 576–77. 
30. Id. at 571.  
31. Id. at 572 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). 
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allowing the public to observe it.32 
The Washington State Constitution of 1889 goes a step further in 
emphasizing the presumption of open court proceedings in Article I, 
Section 10: “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and 
without unnecessary delay.”33 This “separate, clear and specific 
provision entitles the public, and . . . the press is part of that public, to 
openly administered justice.”34 In an early twentieth-century case, the 
Washington State Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a 
criminal defendant because the trial court excluded the general public. 
The Court stated that “[c]ertainly there is not, nor can there be, any 
custom of the court for the trial of criminal cases in private.”35 
The Washington State Supreme Court has noted that the U.S. 
Constitution does not contain the explicit mandate of open 
administration of justice required by the Washington State 
Constitution.36 The Washington State Constitution is thus arguably more 
stringent on this point, making federal cases finding de minimis or trivial 
closures inapposite in a state constitutional analysis.37 At the same time, 
however, both the U.S. and the Washington State Supreme Courts have 
made clear that public right of access is not absolute, and that other 
interests may permit that this access be limited.38 
                                                     
32. Id.  
33. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
34. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (1982) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash. 2d 385, 388, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (1975)). 
35. State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 145, 217 P. 705, 706 (1923). 
36. State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 180 n.12, 137 P.3d 825, 831 n.12 (2006). 
37. Id. Certain members of the court would apply a “de minimis” closure standard when a trial 
closure is “too trivial” to jeopardize the constitutional right to a public trial; this argument relies 
mostly on federal precedent. See Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 167, 182–85 (Madsen, J., concurring); 
see also infra notes 223–51 and accompanying text. 
38. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984) (government’s interest in inhibiting 
disclosure of sensitive information); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 
n.18 (1980) (stating that in order to facilitate the “fair administration of justice,” a trial court has 
discretion to impose “reasonable limitations on access to a trial,” which could include management 
of accommodation, order and decorum); Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 
211, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993) (protection and privacy of child victims); State v. Ishikawa, 97 
Wash. 2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (1982) (citing cases to illustrate permissible limitations on 
public access); Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 65, 615 P.2d 440, 447 (1980) 
(stating that pretrial hearings may be closed upon showing of some likelihood of prejudice to rights 
of defendant to fair trial); In re Lewis, 51 Wash. 2d 193, 198–200, 316 P.2d 907, 910–11 (1957) 
(stating that juvenile proceedings are not constitutionally required to be open).  
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B.  The Sixth Amendment and Article I of the Washington Constitution 
Guarantee the Right of the Accused to a Public Trial 
The U.S. and Washington Constitutions provide, in similar language, 
for the accused’s right to a speedy and public trial.39 This requirement of 
a public trial “is for the benefit of the accused, that the public may see 
that he is fairly dealt by and not unjustly condemned, and that the 
presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a 
sense of their responsibility.”40 The transparency of a public trial, in 
addition to ensuring accountability for judge and prosecutor, also can 
encourage witnesses to appear and can discourage perjury.41 The 
Washington State Supreme Court has recognized that Sections 10 and 22 
“serve complementary and interdependent functions in assuring the 
fairness of our judicial system. In particular, the public trial right 
operates as an essential cog in the constitutional design of fair trial 
safeguards.”42 The Court has employed the same standard for evaluating 
court closures for both Section 10 and Section 22 rights,43 mirroring the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Waller v. Georgia,44 which 
imported its Sixth Amendment public trial standard from closure cases 
brought under the First Amendment’s protection of public access to 
trials.45 
Both the Sixth Amendment and Section 22 also guarantee the right of 
the accused to an impartial jury.46 At first glance, this right does not 
seem directly related to public trial and open courts questions. However, 
balancing the right to an impartial jury with other public trial interests 
has proved to be especially elusive in Washington, where many open 
courts cases have turned on court closures related to jury voir dire.47 
                                                     
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel . . . to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have 
been committed and the right to appeal in all cases . . . .”). 
40. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 312 (photo. reprint 1972) 
(1868). 
41. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984). 
42. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 259, 906 P.2d 325, 328 (1995). 
43. Id. at 259–60, 906 P.2d at 328.  
44. 467 U.S. 39. 
45. Id. at 46–47. 
46. See supra note 39. 
47. See, e.g., State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009); State v. Strode, 167 
Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005); 
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Parties and trial courts have cited, for example, both the defendant’s 
state constitutional right to a fair trial48 and a prospective juror’s right to 
privacy49 to support proposals for closure or sealing.50 
II.  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS DEVELOPED STRICT 
SCRUTINY TESTS TO EVALUATE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COURTROOM CLOSURES 
The U.S. Supreme Court first began formulating standards for a 
doctrine of public access to judicial proceedings in the 1970s and 
1980s.51 The Court had previously recognized a common law 
presumption of openness but had focused primarily on the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantees to the criminal defendant.52 From 1979 to 
2010, however, the Court developed standards to further define not only 
the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant to a public trial, but also a 
First Amendment right of public access to judicial proceedings.53 The 
Court has defined and evaluated several types of closure, including 
exclusion of the public and press from the courtroom during 
                                                     
State v. Applegate, 163 Wash. App. 460, 259 P.3d 311 (2011); State v. Njonge, 161 Wash. App. 
568, 255 P.3d 753 (2011); State v. Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 Wash. App. 299, 254 P.3d 891 (2011); In 
re Stockwell, 160 Wash. App. 172, 248 P.3d 576 (2011); State v. Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. 819, 246 
P.3d 580 (2011), rev. granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 259 P.3d 1109 (2011); State v. Leyerle, 158 
Wash. App. 474, 242 P.3d 921 (2010); State v. Bowen, 157 Wash. App. 821, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010); 
State v. Paumier, 155 Wash. App. 673, 230 P.3d 212 (2010), rev. granted, 169 Wash. 2d 1017, 236 
P.3d 206 (2010); State v. Price, 154 Wash. App. 480, 228 P.3d 1276 (2009); State v. Wise, 148 
Wash. App. 425, 200 P.3d 266 (2009), rev. granted, 170 Wash. 2d 1009, 236 P.3d 207 (2010); State 
v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 193 P.3d 1108 (2008); State v. Erickson, 146 Wash. App. 200, 189 
P.3d 245 (2008); State v. Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 184 P.3d 677 (2008); State v. Duckett, 141 
Wash. App. 797, 173 P.3d 948 (2007); State v. Frawley, 140 Wash. App. 713, 167 P.3d 593 (2007). 
48. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 156, 217 P.3d at 329. 
49. “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
50. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 224, 217 P.3d at 313. 
51. For a helpful discussion of the historical development of the public access doctrine, and of the 
cases discussed in this Section, see Jack B. Harrison, Comment, How Open is Open? The 
Development of the Public Access Doctrine Under State Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1307, 1307–20 (1992). 
52. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (“[T]he [public trial] guarantee has always 
been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of 
persecution.”).  
53. See Presley v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. 
(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 
U.S. 501 (1984); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 
U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
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proceedings, such as pretrial hearings,54 jury selection,55 and witness 
testimony,56 and sealing of court records.57 While recognizing a 
presumption of openness, it has also cited interests that justify the 
closure of a courtroom or sealing of records, including, for example, the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial,58 protection of an ongoing government 
investigation,59 protection of trade secrets,60 protection of witnesses,61 
juror privacy,62 order and security,63 and space constraints.64 After 
deciding a line of cases establishing a First Amendment right of access 
to judicial proceedings, the Court extended the tests it developed to the 
Sixth Amendment right to public trial in the criminal context. 
A.  Four U.S. Supreme Court Cases Identify a First Amendment Right 
to Public Access 
Between 1979 and 1986, the Court developed its public access 
jurisprudence in the criminal context. At first, the Court did not 
recognize a First Amendment right of public access to criminal 
proceedings. By 1986, however, it had acknowledged this right and 
developed a strict scrutiny test to evaluate a courtroom closure or record 
sealing. 
1. Richmond Newspapers: The Court Holds that the Public and Press 
Have a First Amendment Right to Attend Criminal Trials 
In a fractured 1980 opinion,65 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 
right to public trial in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,66 in which 
a trial court closed the courtroom to the public and press for the duration 
                                                     
54. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43–47. 
55. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511–12.  
56. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 598. 
57. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 4–5.  
58. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380. 
59. Waller, 467 U.S. at 41. 
60. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 n.5 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
61. Id. 
62. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 511–12 (1984). 
63. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
64. Id.; Waller, 467 U.S. at 44; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511–12. 
65. Burger, J. announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which White and 
Stevens, JJ. concurred, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and Blackmun, JJ. concurred in the judgment, 
and Rehnquist, J. dissented. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555, 558.  
66. 448 U.S. 555. 
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of a murder trial.67 In an earlier case, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,68 the 
Court had upheld an order closing a pretrial hearing in order to protect 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.69 The Court held in 
Gannett that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was “personal 
to the accused,”70 and did not recognize a constitutional right of public 
access to a pretrial hearing.71 The Court confronted a larger question in 
Richmond Newspapers: whether a judge may close an entire criminal 
trial to the public at the defendant’s request, with no demonstration that 
such closure is necessary to protect the defendant’s “superior right” to a 
fair trial, or some other overriding interest.72 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court emphasized the importance of 
openness in judicial proceedings: “People in an open society do not 
demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to 
accept what they are prohibited from observing.”73 Following a lengthy 
historical survey of the public access doctrine (similar to Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Gannett), Chief Justice Burger concluded in a 
plurality opinion74 that “a presumption of openness inheres in the very 
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice,”75 and that both the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the public’s right to attend 
the defendant’s trial in this case.76 Where the Gannett Court had 
proceeded under a Sixth Amendment analysis, the Court in Richmond 
Newspapers analyzed the public access right under a First Amendment 
conceptual framework.77 The plurality found implicit among the 
guarantees of the First Amendment the public’s right to attend criminal 
trials.78 Because the trial court had not made findings articulating an 
overriding interest in support of closure, the Supreme Court deemed the 
closure unconstitutional and reversed the trial court’s judgment.79 
                                                     
67. This was the fourth trial of this defendant; the first trial was reversed on appeal, and two 
subsequent trials ended in mistrial. Id. at 555.  
68. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
69. Id. at 394. 
70. Id. at 380. 
71. Id. at 391. 
72. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564. 
73. Id. at 572. 
74. He was joined by Justices Stevens and White. Id. at 558.  
75. Id. at 573. 
76. Id. at 580. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 577–80 (cited and discussed in Harrison, supra note 51, at 1317). 
79. Id. at 581. 
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2.  Globe Newspaper Co.: The Court Applies Strict Scrutiny to 
Closures of Criminal Trials 
While Gannett and Richmond Newspapers recognized a right to 
public trial for the defendant and the public and press in the First, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments, the first case to articulate a strict-scrutiny 
test to evaluate the constitutionality of a closure came a year later in 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.80 In Globe, the State had 
requested a closure pursuant to a Massachusetts statute requiring trial 
judges to exclude the press and public from the courtroom during the 
testimony of a minor victim at trials for certain sexual offenses.81 While 
conceding that the right of access to criminal trials is not absolute, and 
that safeguarding the well-being of a minor is a compelling interest, the 
Court held that such a mandatory closure rule violated the First 
Amendment.82 The Court emphasized that “the State’s justification in 
denying access must be a weighty one.”83 Where the State intends to 
deny public access to a proceeding, it must show that “the denial is 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.”84 
3.  Press-Enterprise I and II: The Court Extends the First Amendment 
Public Trial Right to Voir Dire and Reinforces Strict Scrutiny 
In 1984 and 1986, the Court applied and expanded the Globe test in 
two sensational cases, both named Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, Riverside County.85 The two cases involved separate 
high-profile murder trials, in which the trial court attempted to balance 
the press and public’s right of access with the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial. In Press-Enterprise I,86 the trial court excluded the public and press 
from all but three days of a six-week jury voir dire in a case involving 
the rape and murder of a young girl.87 Transcripts of the proceedings 
were sealed.88 The Court reaffirmed that the presumption of openness of 
                                                     
80. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
81. Id. at 598. 
82. Id. at 606–11. 
83. Id. at 606. 
84. Id. at 606–07. 
85. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
86. 464 U.S. 501. 
87. Id. at 503. 
88. Id. at 510. 
09 - Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:39 PM 
1214 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1203 
 
judicial proceedings may be overcome only by “an overriding interest 
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated 
along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine 
whether the closure order was properly entered.”89 The trial court had 
asserted two interests in support of its order to close the court and seal 
the transcripts: the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, and 
the prospective juror’s right to privacy.90 The Court recognized a right to 
privacy for prospective jurors91 but concluded that such a prolonged 
closure was unsupported by findings showing that an open proceeding 
would have threatened the named interests, and moreover that the trial 
court had failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to closure and 
suppression of the transcript.92 The total closure of voir dire was a 
violation of “the constitutional values sought to be protected by holding 
open proceedings.”93 The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remanded the case.94 
In Press-Enterprise II,95 a nurse was charged with murdering twelve 
of his patients.96 The defendant requested and was granted a closure of 
the preliminary hearing on the complaint.97 While a California criminal 
statute required such proceedings to be open, the statute made an 
exception for cases in which the “exclusion of the public is necessary in 
order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.”98 The 
preliminary hearing lasted forty-one days, and the court sealed the 
transcript.99 The California Supreme Court held that there is no general 
First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings, reasoning that 
the right of access recognized in Globe and Press-Enterprise I extended 
                                                     
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 511. Note, however, that Justice Blackmun cautioned against deciding “whether a juror 
has a legitimate expectation, rising to the status of a privacy right, that he will not have to 
answer . . . questions.” Id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This would, according to Justice 
Blackmun, “unnecessarily complicate the lives of trial judges attempting to conduct a voir dire 
proceeding.” Id. at 515. 
92. Id. at 510–11. 
93. Id. at 512. 
94. Id. at 513. 
95. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
96. Id. at 3. 
97. Id. at 3–4. 
98. Id. at 4 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1985)). 
99. Id. at 4–5.  
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only to criminal trials.100 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the right of access does extend to preliminary hearings.101 The Court 
reiterated its Press-Enterprise I test requiring articulation of an 
overriding interest supported by findings that such a narrowly tailored 
closure is essential to preserve higher values.102 The Court conceded that 
publicity surrounding pretrial suppression hearings risks influencing 
public opinion against a defendant by informing potential jurors of 
inculpatory information later ruled inadmissible at trial.103 The Court 
noted, however, that “this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify 
refusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress.”104 In 
any event, “closure of an entire 41-day proceeding would rarely be 
warranted.”105 Here, the California court had violated the press and 
public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.106 
B.  Two U.S. Supreme Court Cases Recognize a Public Trial Right 
Under Both the First and Sixth Amendments 
Just a few months after Press-Enterprise I, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered another lengthy closure, this time a suppression hearing, in 
Waller v. Georgia.107 The more recent case, Presley v. Georgia,108 like 
Press-Enterprise II, involved a closure of voir dire proceedings. In both 
cases, the Court recognized a public trial right under both the First and 
Sixth Amendments. 
1.  Waller v. Georgia: The Court Devises a Four-Part Test to Evaluate 
the Constitutionality of Courtroom Closures 
In Waller, the trial court had granted the prosecution’s motion to close 
a suppression hearing that lasted seven days.109 The State’s argument for 
closure was that some evidence introduced at the hearing might “involve 
a reasonable expectation of privacy of persons other than” the 
                                                     
100. Id. at 5. 
101. Id. at 9–10. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 14. 
104. Id. at 15.  
105. Id. 
106. Id.  
107. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
108. __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010). 
109. Waller, 467 U.S. at 42. 
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defendant.110 This evidence—tapes of conversations intercepted via 
wiretap—constituted only two and a half hours of the seven-day 
hearing.111 
The Court asked three questions: (1) Does the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial extend to a pretrial suppression 
hearing? (2) If so, was that right violated? (3) If so, what is the 
appropriate remedy?112 Noting that previous cases had turned largely on 
First Amendment questions, the Court concluded that “there can be little 
doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less 
protective of a public trial right than the implicit First Amendment right 
of the press and public.”113 The Court reasoned that its earlier holdings 
that the public and press had a First Amendment right to attend criminal 
trials (including pretrial proceedings) led naturally to the conclusion that 
a defendant likewise possessed a right to open proceedings through the 
Sixth Amendment.114 
Applying the factors it articulated in Press-Enterprise I, the Court 
established a new four-part test: (1) the proponent of closure must 
specify an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure 
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial 
court must consider reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4) the court 
must make findings adequate to support the closure.115 The Court 
concluded that the State’s proposal was not specific as to what and 
whose privacy interests were implicated.116 Moreover, a seven-day 
closure for the sake of two and a half hours of taped evidence was overly 
broad and general—“far more extensive than necessary.”117 The trial 
court had not considered alternatives to full and immediate closure, and 
had made only broad, general findings that did not justify the closure.118 
The Court presumed prejudice, agreeing with the “consistent view of the 
lower federal courts”119 that the defendant should not have to prove 
specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of his right to a 
                                                     
110. Id. at 41. 
111. Id. at 42. 
112. Id. at 43. 
113. Id. at 46. 
114. Id. at 44–46. 
115. Id. at 48. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 48–49. 
118. Id. at 48. 
119. Id. at 49. 
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public trial.120 
Having answered the first and second questions of its inquiry, the 
Court considered a remedy that would be “appropriate to the 
violation.”121 Because the violation occurred in the context of a 
suppression hearing, the Court reasoned that the appropriate remedy was 
a new suppression hearing, with significant portions open to the 
public.122 A new trial at this juncture would “presumably be a windfall 
for the defendant, and not in the public interest.”123 The case was 
remanded to the state courts to decide what portions (if any) should be 
closed.124 Only in the event of the suppression of material evidence not 
suppressed at the first trial, or “some other material change in the 
positions of the parties” would a new trial be warranted.125 
2.  Presley v. Georgia: The Court Emphasizes the Obligation of 
Courts to Accommodate Public Attendance at Criminal Trials 
In Presley v. Georgia,126 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed both the 
Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant and the First Amendment 
rights of the public.127 Over the defense’s objection, the trial court 
excluded a lone spectator (who happened to be the defendant’s uncle) 
from jury voir dire.128 The Court did not resolve the question of to what 
extent the First and Sixth Amendment rights to public trial are 
coextensive.129 It concluded, however, that under Press Enterprise I and 
Waller the law extending the Sixth Amendment public trial right to jury 
voir dire is so well established that the Court could proceed by summary 
disposition.130 The Court concluded in its brief per curiam decision that 
“[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to 
accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.”131 In this case, 
because the trial court neither justified a compelling interest nor 
considered alternatives to closure, the closure order was a constitutional 
                                                     
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 50. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010). 
127. Id. at 723. 
128. Id. at 722. 
129. Id. at 724. 
130. Id. at 723–24. 
131. Id. at 725. 
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violation, and the appropriate remedy was reversal and remand.132 
III.  THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS USED 
U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS TO DEVELOP ITS OWN 
TEST TO EVALUATE CLOSURES 
The Washington State Supreme Court has also ruled on cases 
involving closures of pretrial hearings and jury selection, as well as 
record sealing. In its rulings, the Court has used the U.S. Supreme Court 
cases described above to develop its own test for the validity of such 
denials of access. Washington is one of twenty-seven states whose state 
constitution includes a special provision guaranteeing openness in 
judicial proceedings.133 Though the Washington State Supreme Court 
has held134 that “the public’s right of access is not absolute, and may be 
limited to protect other interests,”135 The Court’s decisions have 
consistently emphasized the value of open administration of justice.136 
While the Washington State Supreme Court began its public access and 
public trial analysis in recent cases with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
federal constitutional framework, it has increasingly relied on Article I, 
Section 10 of the Washington Constitution137 and applied a more 
stringent analysis of public access and public trial issues than have the 
federal courts.138 
                                                     
132. Id. 
133. See supra note 5. 
134. See supra note 38.  
135. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (1982). 
136. See, e.g., State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 90–91, 257 P.3d 624, 627–28 (2011); In re 
Detention of D.F.F., 172 Wash. 2d 37, 39–40, 256 P.3d 357, 359–60 (2011); State v. Momah, 167 
Wash. 2d 140, 147–48, 217 P.3d 321, 324–25 (2009); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229–30; 
217 P.3d 310, 315–16 (2009); State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 179, 137 P.3d 825, 830–31 
(2006); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 804–05, 100 P.3d 291, 295–96 (2005); Rufer v. Abbott 
Labs., 154 Wash. 2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182, 1186–87 (2005); Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900, 
903–04, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (2004); State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258, 906 P.2d 325, 327 
(1995); Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 209–10, 848 P.2d 
1258, 1260–61 (1993); Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d at 719; Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 59–60, 615 P.2d 440, 444–45 (1980). 
137. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
138. See, e.g., Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 180 n.12, 137 P.3d at 831 n.12. 
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A.  Kurtz, Ishikawa, and Allied Newspapers: The Washington State 
Supreme Court Develops a Section 10 Test to Evaluate Closures 
Implicating Rights of the Public 
By 1982, the Washington State Supreme Court had used federal 
decisions and state law to devise a five-part analysis for evaluating the 
closure of pretrial hearings and the sealing of court records. Federated 
Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz139 concerned the closure of a suppression 
hearing in a murder trial.140 Because of the notoriety of the case, the 
defense and prosecution jointly moved the court to order closure of a 
pretrial suppression hearing.141 A newspaper publisher petitioned the 
Court to vacate the closure order and unseal the records.142 While noting 
the factual similarities between this case and Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale,143 the Court explicitly set out to resolve this case under the 
Washington Constitution.144 The Court identified five guidelines from 
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Gannett that courts should employ to 
analyze closure questions under Article I, Section 22 of the Washington 
Constitution.145 The Court noted that Section 10 “provides a textual basis 
for recognizing a right of public access to court proceedings.”146 
However, the public’s right in Section 10 must be interpreted in light of 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Section 22.147 What a 
trial court needs is “workable standards that allow it to strike a balance 
between the public’s right of access and the accused’s rights to a fair 
                                                     
139. 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P.2d 440. 
140. Id. at 52, 615 P.2d at 441. 
141. Id. at 53, 615 P.2d at 441.  
142. Id. at 53–54, 615 P.2d at 441-42. 
143. 443 U.S. 368 (1979); see supra notes 68–71. 
144. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 56, 615 P.2d at 443.  
145. The five guidelines provided: 
(1) The accused (proposing closure) must make some showing of likelihood of jeopardy to his 
constitutional rights from an open proceeding. 
(2) Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an opportunity to object. 
However, the court should not be obliged to delay proceedings. 
(3) The objector to closure must demonstrate that there are available practical alternatives that 
would protect defendant’s rights. 
(4) The court must weigh the competing interests of the defendant and the public. 
(5) The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its 
purpose (in this case, to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial while preserving the public’s 
right to open proceedings). 
Id. at 62–65, 615 P.2d at 446–47.  
146. Id. at 59, 615 P.2d at 445.  
147. Id. at 61, 615 P.2d at 445.  
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trial including an impartial jury.”148 Given the particular facts of this 
case, which involved “a sensational homicide combined with extensive 
publicity,”149 the court’s closure order to prevent tainting of the jury pool 
was proper.150 The Court denied the newspaper’s petition.151 
Even as it upheld the trial court’s closure order, the Court in Kurtz 
acknowledged, albeit only in a footnote, the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
holding in Richmond Newspapers that a criminal trial must be open to 
the public “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings.”152 
Two years later in another murder trial in Seattle Times Co. v. 
Ishikawa,153 the Court again made reference to Richmond Newspapers, 
and again observed that its own analysis would rely on Article I, Section 
10 of the Washington State Constitution.154 In Ishikawa, the trial court 
closed a pretrial hearing,155 sealed the record, and refused requests to 
open it to the public.156 Newspapers brought a mandamus action, relying 
on both federal and state constitutional grounds in their argument for 
access.157 
The Court in Ishikawa announced a slightly different Section 10 
analysis, based on the conclusion that a closure to protect the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial should be treated “somewhat differently” 
from closure to protect other interests.158 The trial court had noted that 
ongoing investigations, safety of witnesses, and the possibility that other 
defendants might be charged were some of the other interests served by 
exclusion of the public and press and sealing of records.159 Thus the 
Court decided to expand the framework adopted in Kurtz.160 While 
Judge Ishikawa had cited the defendant’s right to a fair trial as one of the 
                                                     
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 65, 615 P.2d at 447.  
150. Id. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 65 n.4, 615 P.2d at 447 n.4 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555 (1980)). 
153. 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). 
154. Id. at 36, 640 P.2d at 719. 
155. Id. at 33, 640 P.2d at 718. The hearing was for a motion to dismiss. The defense had moved 
to exclude the public, and the prosecution had concurred in the motion to close. Id. at 32, 640 P.2d 
at 717.  
156. Id. at 32–33, 640 P.2d at 717–18.  
157. Id. at 35, 640 P.2d at 719.  
158. Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at 720. 
159. Id. at 38, 640 P.2d at 720. 
160. Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at 720. 
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interests supported by his closure order,161 he had not demonstrated a 
need for continued secrecy to support a permanent sealing of the record 
post-trial162 after the trial was over.163 
In its decision remanding to the trial court for reconsideration of the 
petitioners’ motion to unseal,164 the Washington State Supreme Court 
held that whenever a party seeks restrictions on access to criminal 
hearings or the records from hearings, courts must follow five prescribed 
steps.165 First, the proponent of closure or sealing must make some 
showing of the need, detailing the needs and interests involved as 
specifically as possible without endangering those interests.166 The Court 
noted that “[t]he quantum of need which would justify restrictions on 
access differs” depending on whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial or other federal or state constitutional interests are 
implicated.167 The Sixth Amendment would in turn implicate Article I, 
Section 22, because the Kurtz Court had “start[ed] with the premise that 
section 22 affords fair trial rights which at a minimum must provide to 
the accused the protection he or she enjoys under the Sixth 
Amendment.”168 In cases where the right to a fair trial is at issue, only a 
likelihood of jeopardy to constitutional rights need be shown.169 In cases 
where closure or sealing is sought to further any right or interest besides 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial, a “serious and imminent threat to 
some other important interest” must be demonstrated.170 
Second, the trial court must give anyone present an opportunity to 
object when the closure or sealing is proposed.171 This opportunity 
presupposes that the proponent of closure or sealing has stated grounds 
for the motion with sufficient specificity so that one affected by the 
closure or sealing would be able to evaluate the need for objection.172 
Third, the court, proponents, and objectors should carefully analyze 
                                                     
161. Id. at 44, 640 P.2d at 723.  
162. Id. at 32–33, 42, 640 P.2d at 717–18, 722. 
163. Id. at 44–45, 640 P.2d at 724. 
164. Id. at 45–46, 640 P.2d at 724. 
165. Id. at 37–39, 640 P.2d at 720–21. 
166. Id. at 37, 640 P.2d at 720. 
167. Id. 
168. Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 60, 615 P.2d 440, 445 (1980). 
169. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 720 (citing Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d at 62, 615 P.2d at 
446).  
170. Id.  
171. Id. at 38, 640 P.2d at 720.  
172. Id.  
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whether the proposed restriction is both effective in protecting the 
interests involved and the least restrictive means available to achieve 
those ends.173 The Ishikawa court assigned the burden of proposing 
alternatives differently, depending on the interests involved.174 If the 
closure or sealing is requested to protect the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, the objectors carry the burden of suggesting alternatives to the 
proposed restrictions.175 However, if the endangered rights or interests 
cited do not include the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the burden to 
justify closure or sealing rests with the proponents.176 
Fourth, the trial court must balance the competing interests of the 
defendant and the public, and consider any proposed alternatives to 
closure.177 The court should articulate findings and conclusions, “which 
should be as specific as possible rather than conclusory.”178 
Fifth, “[t]he order must be no broader in its application or duration 
than necessary to serve its purpose.”179 An order sealing records shall 
apply for a specific period of time, and the burden shall be on the 
proponent to come before the court to justify continued sealing.180 
The Court distinguished its decision in Kurtz.181 While the record 
reflected that the trial judge in Kurtz considered the actual impact of 
negative publicity on potential jurors,182 Judge Ishikawa’s “sweeping, 
unsupported conclusion” that total closure and indefinite sealing were 
necessary was not substantiated by factual findings.183 The Court 
contrasted the “indefinite duration” of the sealing order in Ishikawa with 
the narrower tailoring of the closure order in Kurtz.184 The Court 
concluded its analysis: “When a perceived clash between a defendant’s 
fair trial right and the right of free speech arises, courts have an 
affirmative duty to try to accommodate both of those interests.”185 
                                                     
173. Id.  
174. Id.  
175. Id.  
176. Id.  
177. Id. A court may also sua sponte suggest alternatives, and some have. See infra notes 381–86 
and accompanying text. 
178. Id.  
179. Id. at 39 (alteration in original) (quoting Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 
64, 615 P.2d 440, 447 (1980)).  
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 37, 41, 640 P.2d at 720, 722.  
182. Id. at 41, 640 P.2d at 722.  
183. Id.  
184. Id. at 42, 640 P.2d at 722–23.  
185. Id. at 45, 640 P.2d at 724.  
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In 1993, the Court rejected another sweeping closure, this one 
mandated by state statute. In Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. 
Eikenberry,186 the Court analyzed Substitute House Bill (SHB) 2348, 
which required courts to ensure that information identifying child 
victims of sexual assault not be disclosed to the public or press during 
the course of judicial proceedings or in any court records.187 The 
Washington Legislature had articulated a compelling interest—the 
protection of the privacy of child victims of sexual assault—to justify 
the blanket denial of public access.188 The Court held, however, that 
under Article I, Section 10, any closure of judicial proceedings is 
permissible only if such closure or sealing is necessary under the five-
part analysis articulated in Kurtz and Ishikawa.189 Applying the Ishikawa 
test, the Court concluded that at least one of the interests articulated by 
the legislature—protection of the privacy of child victims—was 
guaranteed under the Washington Constitution190 and may well warrant 
closure or sealing on a case-by-case basis.191 However, the blanket 
closures and sealings mandated by SHB 2348 did not permit such 
individualized determinations.192 SHB 2348 was not compatible with the 
Ishikawa guidelines and was therefore unconstitutional.193 
B.  State v. Bone-Club: The Court Applies the Ishikawa Test to a 
Closure Implicating the Section 22 Rights of the Accused 
Ishikawa and Allied Newspapers were both actions brought by 
newspaper companies that sued for public access to judicial records and 
proceedings under Section 10. In 1995, the Washington State Supreme 
Court for the first time applied the Ishikawa test to a closure challenged 
by a criminal defendant under Section 22 in State v. Bone-Club.194 In 
Bone-Club, the Court applied the same closure standard for both Section 
                                                     
186. 121 Wash.2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993). 
187. Id. at 207, 848 P.2d at 1259. 
188. Id. at 211, 848 P.2d at 1261. 
189. Id. at 214. 
190. “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority 
of law.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
191. Allied Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 211, 848 P.2d at 1261.  
192. Id.  
193. Id. The Court concluded that it need not reach the question of whether SHB 2348 also 
violated the open justice requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. at 209, 848 P.2d at 1260.  
194. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). 
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10 and Section 22 rights.195 The Court cited Waller v. Georgia,196 which 
had imported standards from First Amendment cases to decide a Sixth 
Amendment case, as precedent guiding its decision.197 
Whatcom County charged Joseph Bone-Club with six violations of 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, including possession and 
delivery of cocaine.198 The court held a pretrial suppression hearing to 
decide the admissibility of Bone-Club’s statements to police.199 At the 
prosecution’s request, the trial court ordered the courtroom cleared for 
the testimony of an undercover police officer whose evidence was 
crucial to the state’s case against Bone-Club, but who feared his 
testimony in open court would jeopardize his undercover work.200 The 
court denied Bone-Club’s motion to suppress his statement to this 
officer, but granted another motion to suppress a statement made to a 
different officer.201 The undercover officer later testified at trial in open 
court.202 The jury found Bone-Club guilty as charged.203 Bone-Club 
argued on appeal that closure of his suppression hearing violated his 
constitutional right to a public trial, but the court of appeals affirmed his 
convictions.204 
Reviewing its holdings in Allied Newspapers, Kurtz, and Ishikawa, 
the Washington State Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision 
of the court of appeals and articulated what are now known as the Bone-
Club factors: 
1. The proponent of closure or sealing must make some showing [of a 
compelling interest], and where that need is based on a right other than 
an accused’s right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a “serious and 
imminent threat” to that right. 
2. Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an 
opportunity to object to the closure. 
3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least 
restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests. 
4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of 
                                                     
195. Id. at 259–60, 906 P.2d at 328.  
196. 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
197. Id. at 47.  
198. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326.  
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 257, 906 P.2d at 327.  
202. Id.  
203. Id.  
204. State v. Boneclub, 76 Wash. App. 872, 888 P.2d 759 (1995). 
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closure and the public. 
5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than 
necessary to serve its purpose.205 
Applying a somewhat abridged Ishikawa (Section 10) test,206 the 
Court held that the trial court had not considered these five factors 
before closing the courtroom, and therefore had violated Joseph Bone-
Club’s right to a fair trial under Section 22.207 The case was reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.208 
C.  Since Bone-Club, the Court Has Grappled with a Variety of 
Closures 
In the years since Bone-Club, the Washington State Supreme Court 
has considered numerous public-trial challenges to a variety of 
closures.209 In cases where the courtroom was completely closed to the 
public or defendant, the Court has found the closure an unconstitutional 
violation of the right to public trial under Section 10, Section 22, or 
both.210 Cases in which a portion of the proceedings, such as jury voir 
dire, was held outside public view have provoked disagreement among 
the justices.211 
1.  In In re Orange and State v. Brightman, the Court Held that 
Exclusion of the Public Is Unconstitutional Under Section 22 
Criminal defendant Christopher Orange raised a collateral attack on 
his conviction for murder after the trial court, citing space and security 
concerns,212 excluded his family, the victim’s family, and other 
spectators from the courtroom during jury selection.213 The Washington 
                                                     
205. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 258–59, 906 P.2d at 327–28. 
206. See supra notes 166–85 and accompanying text. The Bone-Club test does not, for example, 
explicitly assign the burden of suggesting alternatives in step three. And though the Court noted in 
its Bone-Club opinion the need for specific findings, that requirement is not explicit in the Bone-
Club test as it was in the Ishikawa factors. Compare Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 258–60, 906 P.2d 
at 327–28, with Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 37–39, 640 P.2d 716, 720–21 
(1982). 
207. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 261, 906 P.2d at 329. 
208. Id.  
209. See supra note 136. While this issue arises in civil as well as criminal cases, this comment 
focuses primarily on closures in the criminal context.  
210. See infra notes 212–51 and accompanying text. 
211. See infra notes 252–82 and accompanying text.  
212. In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 802, 100 P.3d 291, 294 (2005). 
213. Id. at 801–02, 100 P.3d at 294.  
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State Supreme Court, analyzing the case in light of Section 22 and the 
Sixth Amendment, held that “the guaranty of open criminal proceedings 
extends to the process of juror selection, which is itself a matter of 
importance, not simply to the adversaries, but to the criminal justice 
system.”214 
Citing Bone-Club, the Court reiterated that in order to protect a 
defendant’s Section 22 right to a public trial, a trial court confronted 
with a closure request must apply the “strict, well-defined standard” that 
the Court had imported from earlier cases analyzing Section 10 rights to 
the open administration of justice.215 The “permanent, full closure of 
voir dire” was “the precise type of closure to which the Bone-Club court 
applied the five, well-settled guidelines.”216 The Court found that the 
Orange trial court had satisfied only the second element of the Bone-
Club test by allowing those present to object.217 Because the record 
contained no finding of a specific threat to a compelling interest, 
narrowly tailored closure, consideration of alternatives, or weighing of 
interests, there was no indication that the trial court considered the 
defendant’s right to a public trial.218 The Court also quoted from In re 
Oliver,219 an early federal Sixth Amendment closure case, to emphasize 
the defendant’s right to have friends and family members present.220 The 
Court held that the trial court had violated Orange’s right to a public 
trial, that such a constitutional violation is per se prejudicial, and that the 
proper remedy for this error was remand for a new trial.221 “[O]ur duty 
under the constitution is to ensure that, absent a closure order narrowly 
drawn to protect a clearly identified compelling interest, a trial court 
may not exclude the public or press from any stage of a criminal 
trial.”222 
While Bone-Club was a unanimous decision, Orange was 6-3. Two 
concurring justices agreed that excluding the defendant’s family 
                                                     
214. Id. at 804, 100 P.3d at 295 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984)). 
215. Id. at 805, 100 P.3d at 296. 
216. Id. at 808, 100 P.3d at 297. 
217. Id. at 811, 100 P.3d at 299. 
218. Id. at 811–12, 100 P.3d at 299. 
219. 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
220. Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 800, 100 P.3d at 293. (“[N]either the size of the courtroom nor a 
general concern for security provided an adequate basis for compromising the fundamental tenet 
‘that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives, and counsel present, no 
matter with what offense he may be charged.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 271–72 (1948)). 
221. Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 800, 100 P.3d at 293. 
222. Id.  
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members violated his constitutional rights.223 The concurrence and one 
dissenting justice, however, disagreed that failure to apply the Bone-
Club factors automatically requires a retrial.224 Justice Madsen in her 
concurrence argued that if even an unjustified closure is “de minimis in 
fact,” it does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights.225 She 
took the majority to task for “placing form over substance” by holding 
that a trial court’s failure to apply Bone-Club automatically requires a 
new trial.226 This remains a point of contention in Washington; only two 
Supreme Court public trial cases since Bone-Club have resulted in 
unanimous decisions.227 
State v. Brightman228 featured facts analogous to those of Orange: the 
trial court in a murder trial sua sponte ordered the exclusion of the 
public during voir dire, citing unspecified concerns about space and 
security.229 The court of appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, 
citing the absence of a written order and the lack of evidence that the 
trial court enforced its ruling.230 The Supreme Court of Washington 
reversed.231 Because the trial court record lacked “any hint” that the 
court conducted a Bone-Club analysis to weigh the closure interests 
against Brightman’s right to a public trial, the Court was unable to 
determine whether the closure was warranted.232 The Court remanded 
the case for a new trial.233 
                                                     
223. Id. at 825–26, 100 P.3d at 306–07 (Madsen J., concurring in majority; she was joined by 
Bridge, J.). 
224. Id. at 827, 100 P.3d at 307 (Madsen, J., concurring in majority); id. at 828, 100 P.3d at 307. 
(Ireland, J., dissenting).  
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 822, 827, 100 P.3d at 305, 307. 
227. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 257 P.3d 624 (2011); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 
506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005).  
228. 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122 P.3d 150. 
229. Id. at 511, 122 P.3d at 153. The judge stated:  
In terms of observers and witnesses, we can’t have any observers while we are selecting the 
jury, so if you would tell the friends, relatives, and acquaintances of the victim and defendant 
that the first two or three days for selecting the jury the courtroom is packed with jurors, they 
can’t observe that. It causes a problem in terms of security.  
Id. 
230. Id. at 512–13, 100 P.3d at 153. 
231. Id. at 518, 100 P.3d at 156. 
232. Id. 
233. Id.  
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2.  In State v. Easterling, the Court Holds Unconstitutional the 
Exclusion of Both the Public and the Defendant 
At the request of a codefendant’s counsel, a judge excluded the 
public, defendant Easterling, and his counsel from the courtroom in State 
v. Easterling.234 Prosecutors, court personnel, the codefendant, and his 
counsel were permitted to remain.235 What followed were closed-
courtroom plea negotiations between prosecutors and Easterling’s 
codefendant that resulted in a plea agreement contingent on the 
codefendant’s testimony against Easterling.236 The trial resumed, and the 
jury convicted Easterling.237 The court of appeals affirmed.238 The 
Supreme Court of Washington held that the trial court had committed 
reversible error not only by violating Easterling’s right to a public trial 
under Article I, Section 22, but also by violating the public’s right to an 
“open public trial” under Article I, Section 10.239 
The State in Easterling argued that the closure was de minimis, citing 
Justice Madsen’s Orange concurrence and cases from other jurisdictions 
that held that certain closures are “too trivial” to implicate the right to 
public trial.240 The Court, however, pointed out that a majority of the 
Washington State Supreme Court, unlike many federal courts, has never 
found the violation of the right to public trial to be de minimis.241 The 
Court surmised that the reluctance of the Washington State Supreme 
Court to find trivial or de minimis closures may stem from the additional 
emphasis Section 10 gives to the value of the open administration of 
justice.242 The Court concluded that appellate courts will not need to 
engage in a de minimis analysis as long as trial courts apply the Bone-
Club test.243 Waller had already established that where a violation of the 
                                                     
234. 157 Wash. 2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006). 
235. Id. at 172, 137 P.3d at 827. 
236. Id. at 173, 137 P.3d at 827. 
237. Id.  
238. Id.  
239. Id. at 179, 137 P.3d at 830. The Court also cited Press-Enterprise II here and its assertion 
that the right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused under the Sixth Amendment and 
the public under the First Amendment, “the common concern being the issue of fairness.” Press-
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).  
240. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 180, 137 P.3d at 831 (citing In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 
824–25, 100 P.3d 291, 305–06 (Madsen, J., concurring in majority) (collecting federal cases where 
brief or inadvertent closures were deemed too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment)). 
241. Id. at 180, 137 P.3d at 831. 
242. Id. at 180 n.12, 137 P.3d at 831 n.12.  
243. Id.  
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public trial right occurs, a defendant is not required to show specific 
prejudice.244 Here, both Easterling’s right to a public trial under Section 
22 and the public’s right to open access to justice under Section 10 were 
violated by the improper closure.245 The remedy, as in Bone-Club, 
Orange, and Brightman, was reversal and remand for a new trial.246 
Concurring again in Easterling, Justice Madsen argued that 
“[d]epending upon the factual circumstances in a case, a closure may be 
so trivial that the defendant’s right to a public trial is not implicated.”247 
She argued again that “the de minimis or trivial trial closure standard 
may . . . permit avoidance of a constitutionally unnecessary retrial when 
a defendant’s right to a public trial has not been violated.”248 She 
supported her argument with a list of cases from other state and federal 
jurisdictions in which courts applied some kind of “triviality standard” to 
hold that closures did not violate the Sixth Amendment.249 In his 
separate concurrence, Justice Chambers agreed that there may be 
closures that do not implicate the accused’s right to public trial.250 
However, he argued that there is no de minimis violation of Article I, 
Section 10: 
[T]here is no case where the principle of openness, as enshrined 
in our state constitution, can properly be described as de 
minimis. . . . [T]he constitutional requirement that justice be 
administered openly is not just a right held by the defendant. It 
is a constitutional obligation of the courts. It is integral to our 
system of government. . . . When the courtroom doors are 
locked without a [Bone-Club] analysis, the people deserve a new 
trial.251 
3.  State v. Strode and State v. Momah: Two Closures of Voir Dire 
Dictate Two Different Results 
In 2009, the Court decided two public-trial cases the same day, with 
opposite results.252 State v. Strode,253 a child rape case, involved the 
                                                     
244. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984). 
245. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 181–82, 137 P.3d at 832. 
246. Id. at 182, 137 P.3d at 832.  
247. Id. at 185, 137 P.3d at 833 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
248. Id. at 183, 137 P.3d at 832 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
249. Id. at 183–85, 137 P.3d at 832–33 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
250. Id. at 186, 137 P.3d at 834 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 186–87, 137 P.3d at 834–35 (Chambers, J., concurring). 
252. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 
140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009). 
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questioning of individual jurors in chambers.254 The Court held that this 
private questioning constituted a closure, and that the trial court had 
violated the defendant’s right to a public trial by not engaging in a Bone-
Club analysis.255 The Court reversed Strode’s conviction and remanded 
for a new trial.256 State v. Momah257 was also a sex-crime case involving 
a similar private questioning of jurors.258 The Court held there, however, 
that a partial closure of voir dire to safeguard the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial was not a structural error and affirmed his convictions.259 
How did the Court distinguish Strode and Momah, which both 
involved partial closure of voir dire? First, certain members of the Court 
emphasized the different interests that each closure sought to protect.260 
In Momah, “the trial judge closed the courtroom to safeguard [Charles] 
Momah’s constitutional right to a fair trial[,] . . . not to protect any other 
interests.”261 In Strode, the trial judge closed portions of voir dire to 
protect the privacy of jurors.262 
The Court also distinguished the two cases by whether the 
“requirements and purposes” of the Bone-Club analysis were met.”263 In 
Momah, the majority observed that the trial court had “sought input from 
the defendant, [and] closed the courtroom [only] after consultation with 
the defense and the prosecution.”264 In Strode, by contrast, the record did 
not show that the trial court had considered the right to public trial in 
light of competing interests.265 Additionally, the Court in Momah 
asserted that the defendant “affirmatively assented to the closure, argued 
for its expansion, had the opportunity to object but did not, actively 
                                                     
253. 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310. 
254. Id. at 223–24, 137 P.3d at 312–13. At least eleven prospective jurors were questioned in 
chambers after completing a confidential questionnaire asking whether they or anyone close to them 
had been the victim or accused of sexual abuse. Six prospective jurors were excused for cause after 
private questioning with the trial judge, both counsel, and defendant present. Id. 
255. Id. at 231, 137 P.3d at 316. 
256. Id.  
257. 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321. 
258. Id. at 145–46, 217 P.3d at 323–24. Counsel questioned approximately twenty-four jurors 
privately in chambers; the record shows that most questions regarded prior knowledge of the case 
from the extensive pretrial media coverage. Id. at 147 n.1, 217 P.3d at 324 n.1. 
259. Id. at 156, 217 P.3d at 329. 
260. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 231–32, 217 P.3d at 316–17 (Fairhurst, J., concurring). 
261. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 217 P.3d at 327. 
262. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 224, 217 P.3d at 313. 
263. Id. at 234, 217 P.3d at 318 (Fairhurst, J., concurring). 
264. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151, 217 P.3d at 327. 
265. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 235, 217 P.3d at 318 (Fairhurst, J., concurring). 
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participated in it, and benefited from it.”266 While not explicitly holding 
that Momah had waived his right to a public trial, the Court observed 
that Momah “made tactical choices to achieve what he perceived as the 
fairest result.”267 On the contrary, the Court in Strode rejected the State’s 
argument that the defendant’s failure to object to the private questioning 
of jurors constituted waiver of his right to a public trial.268 Moreover, the 
Court pointed out that while a defendant can waive his own right to a 
public trial, he cannot waive the public’s right to open proceedings under 
Section 10.269 
Finally, the Court distinguished the cases by the type of error that 
occurred with each closure, and the remedy. In Strode, the Court held 
that the partial closure of voir dire constituted a denial of Tony Strode’s 
constitutional right to a public trial, which is “one of the limited classes 
of fundamental rights not subject to harmless error analysis,”270 but 
rather is a “structural error, and prejudice is necessarily presumed.”271 In 
Momah, however, the Court held that the closure was not structural 
error.272 Rather, the closure occurred to protect Momah’s rights and had 
not prejudiced him.273 Concluding that the error was not structural, that 
the trial court had recognized the competing Section 22 interests (public 
trial and impartial jury) in the case, and that Momah had accepted and 
benefited from the closure, the Court held that reversal and remand 
“cannot be the remedy under these circumstances.”274 The Court 
affirmed Momah’s conviction.275 
Momah was a 6-3 decision,276 and Strode was a 4-2-3 plurality.277 The 
various arguments of the five opinions illustrate the persistent 
disagreement among the justices that feeds the continuing uncertainty of 
trial courts. Justice Charles Johnson, in his dissent in Strode, takes the 
                                                     
266. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151, 217 P.3d at 327. 
267. Id. at 155, 217 P.3d at 328. 
268. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 229, 217 P.3d at 315. 
269. Id. at 229–30, 217 P.3d at 315. 
270. Id. at 231, 217 P.3d at 316 (quoting State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 181, 137 P.3d 
825, 831 (2006)). 
271. Id. (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)). 
272. State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 145, 156, 217 P.3d 321, 324, 329 (2009). An error is 
structural in nature when it “necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an 
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.” Id. at 155–56, 217 P.3d at 329. 
273. Id. at 156, 217 P.3d at 329. 
274. Id.  
275. Id.  
276. Id. at 140, 217 P.3d at 322. 
277. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 222, 217 P.3d 310, 310 (2009). 
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majority to task for “ignor[ing] Strode’s right to an impartial jury under 
article I, section 22 and dismiss[ing] the legitimate privacy interests of 
jurors,”278 and for giving the defendant a “windfall” for participating in a 
closure that likely benefited him.279 In his vigorous dissent in Momah, 
Justice Alexander, the author of the Strode plurality opinion, retorts that 
“a new trial is not a ‘windfall’ for anyone when public trial rights are set 
aside for the sake of expediency.”280 After reiterating his position that 
there is no exception to the rule that a courtroom may be closed without 
a proper hearing and order,281 he concludes that “the expense of a retrial 
pales in comparison to the harm done to the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to have justice in this state administered openly.”282 
IV.  MANY COURTS OF APPEALS’ DECISIONS DEMONSTRATE 
TRIAL COURTS’ CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES APPLYING 
WASHINGTON’S CLOSURE TEST 
All three divisions of the Washington Courts of Appeals have 
addressed cases involving the right to public trial,283 and five such cases 
                                                     
278. Id. at 242, 217 P.3d at 321 (C. Johnson, J., dissenting). 
279. Id.  
280. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 165, 217 P.3d at 333 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
281. Id. at 166, 217 P.3d at 334 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
282. Id.  
283. For cases from Division I, see, for example, State v. Hummel, 165 Wash. App. 749, 770–77, 
266 P.3d 269, 281–82 (2012); State v. Applegate, 163 Wash. App. 460, 464–72, 259 P.3d 311, 314–
18 (2011); State v. Njonge, 161 Wash. App. 568, 573–80, 255 P.3d 753, 755–59 (2011); State v. 
Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 Wash. App. 299, 303–07, 254 P.3d 891, 892–96 (2011); State v. Tarhan, 159 
Wash. App. 819, 824–35, 246 P.3d 580, 583–89 (2011), rev. granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 259 P.3d 
1109 (2011); In re Detention of Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 379–87, 246 P.3d 550, 552–57 
(2011); State v. Price, 154 Wash. App. 480, 485–89, 228 P.3d 1276, 1278–80 (2010); State v. 
Coleman, 151 Wash. App. 614, 617–24, 214 P.3d 158, 159–63 (2009); State v. Waldon, 148 Wash. 
App. 952, 957–67, 202 P.3d 325, 328–33 (2009); State v. Rivera, 108 Wash. App. 645, 652–53, 32 
P.3d 292, 296–97 (2001). For a list of cases from Division II, see, for example, State v. Bennett, 168 
Wash. App. 197, 200–07, 275 P.3d 1224, 1226–29 (2012); In re Stockwell, 160 Wash. App. 172, 
177–81, 248 P.3d 576, 578–80 (2011); State v. Smith, No. 38868-5-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Feb. 23, 2011); State v. Leyerle, 158 Wash. App. 474, 478–501, 242 P.3d 921, 923–28 (2010); State 
v. Bowen, 157 Wash. App. 821, 828–33, 239 P.3d 1114, 1118–20 (2010); State v. Sublett, 156 
Wash. App. 160, 181–83, 231 P.3d 231, 242–43 (2010); rev. granted, 170 Wash. 2d 1016, 245 P.3d 
775 (2010); State v. Paumier, 155 Wash. App. 673, 677–86, 230 P.3d 212, 215–19 (2010), rev. 
granted, 169 Wash. 2d 1017, 236 P.3d 206 (2010); State v. Heath, 150 Wash. App. 121, 125–39, 
206 P.3d 712, 714–16 (2009); State v. Wise, 148 Wash. App. 425, 432–45, 200 P.3d 266, 269–75 
(2009), rev. granted, 170 Wash. 2d 1009, 236 P.3d 207 (2010); State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 
109–18, 193 P.3d 1108, 1114–19 (2008); State v. Erickson, 146 Wash. App. 200, 204–11, 189 P.3d 
245, 247–51 (2008); State v. Russell, 141 Wash. App. 733, 737–41, 172 P.3d 361, 362–65 (2007). 
For a list of cases from Division III, see, for example, State v. Castro, 159 Wash. App. 340, 342–44, 
246 P.3d 228, 229–30 (2011); State v. Koss, 158 Wash. App. 8, 16–19, 241 P.3d 415, 418–19 
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are under review at the Washington State Supreme Court.284 Appeals of 
cases in which the trial court has ordered closures of voir dire have 
resulted in numerous reversals of convictions. In their decisions 
reversing the trial court, the courts of appeals have held that court rules 
regarding juror privacy cannot “trump constitutional requirements that 
the trial be public,”285 and “[o]ur Supreme Court has made clear that the 
trial court must engage in the five-part analysis set out in State v. Bone-
Club before conducting all or a portion of voir dire outside of the public 
forum of the courtroom.”286 In a 2010 voir dire closure case, State v. 
Paumier,287 the court of appeals engaged in a detailed comparative 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Strode and Momah.288 It 
noted that Momah’s “remedy . . . appropriate to the violation” language 
from Waller seemed to back off the bright-line rule of automatic reversal 
to which the Court had been adhering since Bone-Club.289 The Paumier 
court observed that while six justices in Strode agreed that some kind of 
Bone-Club analysis was required before closing the courtroom, it “was 
not clear after Momah and Strode . . . what the appropriate remedy 
should be” when no Bone-Club test is applied.290 The Paumier panel 
then cited the case it believed was controlling: Presley v. Georgia,291 
decided three months after Momah and Strode.292 While Presley does not 
require all proceedings to be open in all circumstances, it requires a trial 
court to consider reasonable alternatives to closure and to justify such a 
                                                     
(2010); State v. O’Connor, 155 Wash. App. 282, 291–93, 229 P.3d 880, 883–84 (2010); State v. 
Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 916–18, 184 P.3d 677, 679 (2008); State v. Duckett, 141 Wash. App. 
797, 802–13, 173 P.3d 948, 950–54 (2007); State v. Frawley, 140 Wash. App. 713, 719–26, 167 
P.3d 593, 595–97 (2007).  
284. Four of these cases were decided as this issue went to press: State v. Sublett, No. 84856-4 
(Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. Paumier, No. 84585-9 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); State v. Wise, No. 
82802-4 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012); In re Personal Restraint of Morris, No. 84929-3 (Wash. Nov. 21, 
2012) (also involving in-chambers questioning of prospective jurors). See author’s note, supra. A 
fifth case remains to be decided: State v. Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. 819, 246 P.3d 580 (2011), rev. 
granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 259 P.3d 1109 (2011). 
285. Frawley, 140 Wash. App. at 720, 167 P.3d at 596.  
286. Duckett, 141 Wash. App. at 802–03, 173 P.3d at 950–51. 
287. 155 Wash. App. 673, 230 P.3d 212.  
288. Id. at 679–83, 230 P.3d at 216–18. 
289. Id. at 680, 230 P.3d at 216. 
290. Id. at 683, 230 P.3d at 218. 
291. 558 U.S. 209, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010); see supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.  
292. Paumier, 155 Wash. App. at 685, 230 P.3d at 219. The Washington Supreme Court released 
opinions for both Momah and Strode on October 8, 2009. State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 
P.3d 321 (2009); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009). Presley was decided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court on January 19, 2010. Presley v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722 
(2010). 
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closure in findings.293 Because there had been no consideration of 
alternatives or findings justifying the closure, the court of appeals in 
Paumier held that the defendant’s convictions must be reversed.294 
In upholding a conviction in a factually analogous case, however, a 
different court of appeals panel in State v. Wise295 employed a kind of de 
minimis analysis, holding that the trial court’s private questioning of 
eight prospective jurors in chambers, on the record, and with defendant 
and counsel present, did not constitute a closure requiring a Bone-Club 
analysis: “Closure, if any, was temporary and partial, below the 
‘temporary, full closure’ threshold of Bone-Club.”296 State v. Wise and 
State v. Paumier are currently under review by the Washington State 
Supreme Court.297 
Over the last five years, the courts of appeals have reversed over ten 
convictions for private questioning of jurors outside of open court,298 and 
one for closure of a Batson hearing.299 The courts of appeals have also 
faced questions surrounding the sealing of documents.300 In cases of the 
sealing of jury questionnaires, the courts have often not found structural 
error requiring reversal, but rather a Waller-style 
“remedy . . . appropriate to the violation,”301 likely a remand to the trial 
court for reconsideration of the sealing order.302 One of these cases is 
also under review by the Washington State Supreme Court: State v. 
Tarhan,303 which concerned the sealing of confidential jury 
questionnaires in a rape case.304 
Finally, in State v. Sublett,305 the Court will decide whether the public 
trial right applies to a trial court’s conference with counsel on how to 
                                                     
293. Paumier, 155 Wash. App. at 685, 230 P.3d at 219. 
294. Id.  
295. 148 Wash. App. 425, 200 P.3d 266 (2009). 
296. Id. at 436, 200 P.3d at 272 (citation omitted). 
297. See supra note 284.  
298. See supra note 286.  
299. State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 106, 193 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2008). 
300. See, e.g., In re Stockwell, 160 Wash. App. 172, 175, 248 P.3d 576, 577 (2011); State v. 
Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. 819, 821, 246 P.3d 580, 582 (2011), rev. granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 259 
P.3d 1109 (2011); State v. Coleman, 151 Wash. App. 614, 617, 214 P.3d 158, 159 (2009); State v. 
Waldon, 148 Wash. App. 952, 955, 202 P.3d 325, 327 (2009). 
301. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). 
302. Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. at 821, 246 P.3d at 582; Coleman, 151 Wash. App. at 617, 214 
P.3d at 159. 
303. 159 Wash. App. 819, 246 P.3d 580. 
304. Id. at 821, 246 P.3d at 582.  
305. 156 Wash. App. 160, 231 P.3d 231 (2010). 
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resolve a legal question submitted by the jury during its deliberations in 
a murder trial.306 In addition, the petitions for review of more cases have 
been stayed pending the decisions in the cases currently under review.307 
As one court of appeals judge recently observed, “[t]he law regarding a 
defendant’s and the public’s right to public trial proceedings is under 
scrutiny and continues to evolve as our Supreme Court addresses issues 
surrounding trial court closures.”308 
V.  THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
CLEARLY DEFINE CLOSURE AND THEN REVISE THE 
BONE-CLUB TEST 
Washington open courts jurisprudence has become increasingly 
complex and confusing. Although the Bone-Club test enumerated factors 
for evaluating proposed closures, the test has left some questions 
unanswered, and the unsettled state of the law demonstrates that it has 
not always been an effective tool for trial courts. What can courts use to 
more effectively analyze open courts issues? For years, pilots and 
medical professionals have used deceptively simple checklists to manage 
routine practices in increasingly complex areas.309 These checklists help 
prevent the overlooking of routine but crucial matters that might get lost 
amidst the strain of more pressing events. Checklists also provide 
reminders of minimum necessary procedures, making them explicit.310 
They act as a kind of “cognitive net.”311 An “open courts checklist” will 
help trial courts, which handle heavy caseloads with scarce resources, to 
manage what is becoming an increasingly complex area of Washington 
law. A checklist will also facilitate the creation of a clear record for 
review. 
To protect the constitutional rights to public trial and open 
administration of justice while also respecting other important interests, 
Washington courts should first answer the threshold question: What is a 
closure? Whether the proposed action constitutes a closure should be the 
                                                     
306. Id. at 160, 169, 231 P.3d at 231, 236–37. 
307. State v. Smith, 162 Wash. App. 833, 262 P.3d 72 (2011) (sealing of jury questionnaires); 
State v. Koss, 158 Wash. App. 8, 241 P.3d 415 (2010) (jury instruction conference in chambers); 
State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 193 P.3d 1108 (2008) (closed Batson hearing). All of these 
cases were cited in State v. Bennett, 168 Wash. App. 197, 201 n.5, 275 P.3d 1224, 1226 n.5 (2012). 
308. Bennett, 168 Wash. App. at 197, 201 n.5, 275 P.3d at 1226 n.5. 
309. See supra note 15. 
310. See GAWANDE, supra note 15, at 36. 
311. Id. at 48. 
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first checklist question in a revised Bone-Club test.312 The remaining 
checklist questions will provide clear guidance to the trial courts for 
evaluating proposed closures, and facilitate the creation of a clear record 
for review. The goals are improved judicial economy, increased public 
confidence, and clear and constitutional public trial/open justice 
jurisprudence. 
A.  Courts Should Apply an “Open Courts Checklist” 
The first question in a revised Bone-Club test should be whether the 
proposed action constitutes a closure.313 If the answer is no, public trial 
and open access rights are not implicated.314 If the proposed denial of 
access is or may be a closure, then the court must answer the remaining 
checklist questions set forth below, creating a record for review. 
1.  Would this Denial of Access Constitute a Closure? 
In the oral arguments at the Washington State Supreme Court for 
State v. Lormor315 on May 3, 2011, the attorney representing the State 
asked the Justices “to articulate clearly what is a closure and what 
isn’t.”316 This question is at the very heart of cases involving the right to 
public trial and the open administration of justice and is the first question 
that a court must answer. It is possible at this point to derive some rules 
about what does and does not constitute a closure requiring the test. 
a.  The Court Should Distinguish Between Adversarial and Ministerial 
Proceedings and Clearly Define What Is in the Trial Court’s 
Discretion 
Washington cases provide some guidance on what constitutes a 
closure. Full exclusion of the public from proceedings within a 
courtroom is a closure.317 Wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s family 
is a closure.318 Exclusion of one person, even a family member, in order 
                                                     
312. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
313. See State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 93–94, 257 P.3d 624, 629 (2011). 
314. Id. at 96, 257 P.3d at 630. 
315. 172 Wash. 2d 85, 257 P.3d 624.  
316. Oral Arguments at 24:43, State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d. 85, 257 P.3d 624 (2011), available 
at http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011050034B. 
317. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 92, 257 P.3d at 628.  
318. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722 (2010); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 272 (1948); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 800–01, 100 P.3d 291, 293–94 (2005).  
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to reduce noise and possible distractions, however, is not a closure and is 
within the discretion of the trial court.319 Private questioning of jurors 
when the public is fully excluded is a closure, though the interests of 
juror privacy320 and the integrity of the jury pool are interests a court 
may consider in deciding whether such a closure is justified.321 
Questioning of jurors one at a time is not a closure if the questioning 
occurs in open court, even if the remaining venire is kept elsewhere.322 
The trial judge in both Wise and Paumier privately questioned 
prospective jurors on matters regarding not only administrative 
empanelment, but also regarding their fitness to serve on this particular 
jury. This private questioning constituted a closure. The sealing of 
documents, as in State v. Tarhan, is also a closure that implicates the 
public’s right to open administration of justice.323 
A trial court has both inherent and statutory324 authority to preserve 
and enforce order in the proceedings before it.325 Management of space 
and accommodation is within the discretion of the trial court and does 
                                                     
319. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 96–97, 257 P.3d at 630. 
320. Trial courts in smaller communities have raised heightened privacy concerns that they would 
argue constitute overriding interests. Even statutory qualification and hardship discussions not 
pertaining to the defendant’s trial may necessitate a prospective juror’s revelation of personal 
matters regarding health or finances. While the Court has been clear that a court rule (i.e., GR 31(j) 
safeguarding juror privacy) cannot trump a constitutional provision (i.e., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10), 
the Court’s decisions seem to indicate that an interest such as juror privacy could justify a closure. 
See supra note 278, and infra note 324. The key step is still to weigh interests via application of the 
Bone-Club factors and to articulate a clear rationale in specific findings. 
321. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 236, 217 P.3d 310, 318 (2009) (Fairhurst, J., concurring) 
(“I agree that jurors’ privacy is a compelling interest that trial courts must protect.”); State v. 
Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 152, 217 P.3d 321, 327 (2009) (stating that a fair and impartial jury, 
secured by effective voir dire, is among rights guaranteed by WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22). 
322. State v. Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 917, 184 P.3d 677, 679 (2008). 
323. See supra discussion of Seattle Times v. Ishikawa, notes 153–85 and accompanying text; see 
also State v. Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. 819, 246 P.3d 580 (2011), rev. granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 
259 P.3d 1109 (2011); State v. Coleman, 151 Wash. App. 614, 617, 214 P.3d 158, 159 (2009). 
324. The Washington Revised Code provides in pertinent part:  
Every court of justice has power—(1) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence. 
(2) To enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person or body empowered to 
conduct a judicial investigation under its authority. (3) To provide for the orderly conduct of 
proceedings before it or its officers. (4) To compel obedience to its judgments, decrees, orders 
and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action, suit or proceeding pending 
therein. (5) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of 
all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter 
appertaining thereto. (6) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action, suit or 
proceeding therein, in the cases and manner provided by law. (7) To administer oaths in an 
action, suit or proceeding pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in 
the exercise of its powers or the performance of its duties. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.010(1)–(7) (2012). 
325. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 93–94, 257 P.3d 624, 628–29 (2011). 
09 - Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:39 PM 
1238 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1203 
 
not constitute closure when the public has been accommodated as far as 
possible.326 The court has the authority to manage photography in the 
courtroom,327 and order the screening or searching of spectators entering 
the courtroom.328 
But many questions remain. The Washington State Supreme Court 
has not yet ruled on whether in-chambers conferences for issues such as 
jury instructions constitute closure.329 Nor has it addressed courtroom 
sidebars, which trial judges are increasingly reluctant to conduct in light 
of the unsettled state of the law.330 The courts of appeals have held that 
public trial rights apply to “adversary proceedings,” such as presentation 
of evidence, suppression hearings, and jury selection, as opposed to 
ministerial proceedings.331 The Washington State Supreme Court has 
granted review in a case involving in-chambers conferences for 
questions submitted by the jury, and has stayed several petitions for 
review involving similar issues.332 In State v. Sublett, the case granted 
review, the question sent to the trial judge by the deliberating jury 
involved a purely legal matter not requiring the resolution of disputed 
facts.333 It was not part of the evidentiary phase or other “adversarial 
                                                     
326. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 600 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
327. State v. Russell, 141 Wash. App. 733, 741, 172 P.3d 361, 364–65 (2007) (holding that trial 
court balanced interests of defendant’s right to public trial with court’s authority to control 
courtroom photography under GR 16). 
328. State v. O’Connor, 155 Wash. App. 282, 293, 229 P.3d 880, 884 (2010). 
329. A case involving this issue is under review by the Washington State Supreme Court. See 
supra notes 305–06. 
330. Interview with the Hon. Susan Craighead, King Cnty. Superior Court Judge, in Seattle, 
Wash. (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview with the Hon. Anne Ellington, Wash. State Court of Appeals 
Judge, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 29, 2011).  
331. State v. Koss, 158 Wash. App. 8, 16–17, 241 P.3d 415, 418–19 (2010) (determining that 
closed proceedings involving language of jury instructions were of purely ministerial legal nature 
and not in violation of public trial right); State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 114, 193 P.3d 1108, 
1117 (2008) (stating that defendant does not have right to public hearing on purely ministerial or 
legal matters that do not require the resolution of disputed facts); State v. Rivera, 108 Wash. App. 
645, 653, 32 P.3d 292, 296–97 (2001) (holding that closed hearing to discuss a juror’s complaint 
about another juror’s hygiene was ministerial matter, not adversary proceeding, and thus did not 
implicate right to public trial). 
332. See supra notes 13 and 307. 
333. The jury asked the following question: 
 Clarification of Instruction 21. The structuring of the 2nd sentence in the 1st paragraph is 
unclear. Which of the following is correct for intent? A person (X) is legally accountable for 
the conduct of another person (Y) when he or she (X) is an accomplice of such other person 
(Y) in the commission of the crime.—OR—A person (X) is legally accountable for the conduct 
of another person (Y) when he or she (Y) is an accomplice of such other person (X) in the 
commission of the crime.  
State v. Sublett, 156 Wash. App. 160, 178, 231 P.3d 231, 241 (2010). The judge, after conferring 
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proceedings.” As such, it was a purely legal proceeding not touching on 
the defendant’s rights, and thus not a closure requiring application of the 
checklist. 
Sidebar and in-chambers conferences to discuss legal issues or 
ministerial aspects of the proceeding arguably do not implicate either the 
appellant’s right to a public trial or the public’s right to open 
administration of justice.334 Ministerial proceedings may include 
scheduling, order of witnesses, statutory or administrative empanelment 
of jurors, including general qualifications and even hardship not specific 
to a defendant’s case.335 The court of appeals held that closing the 
courtroom for a brief hearing on a juror’s complaint about another 
juror’s hygiene did not violate the defendant’s right to public trial.336 
While at least one court has observed that jury instruction conferences 
may involve disputed facts, and therefore may not be purely an 
administrative or legal matter,337 questions about whether evidence 
supports instructions are questions of law, not fact. These conferences 
typically involve questions such as formatting and proofreading, or pure 
questions of law that do not touch on a defendant’s rights.338 A historical 
survey of what Washington judges have been able to do “at chambers” 
since the earliest days of the state reveals that sidebars and in-chambers 
conferences to discuss legal matters have long been seen as 
constitutional and within the authority of the trial judge.339 Remarks that 
                                                     
with counsel in chambers, answered “I cannot answer your question please re-read your 
instructions.” Id.  
334. In re Detention of Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 384–86, 246 P.3d 550, 555–56 (2011); 
accord State v. Castro, 159 Wash. App. 340, 343, 246 P.3d 228, 229–30 (2011); State v. Smith, No. 
38868-5-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2011, as amended on Denial of Motion to Publish 
Feb. 23, 2011); Koss, 158 Wash. App. at 16–17, 241 P.3d at 418; Rivera, 108 Wash. App. at 653, 32 
P.3d at 296–97. But see State v. Bennett, 168 Wash. App. 197, 204, 275 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2012) 
(“[E]ven in proceedings involving purely legal matters, the public’s presence may ensure the 
fairness of such proceedings, although the same cannot be said for ministerial or administrative 
matters that do not impact the defendant’s rights.”) (emphasis added). 
335. See State v. Irby, 170 Wash. 2d 874, 887, 246 P.3d 796, 803 (2011) (Madsen, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that excusal of potential jurors for personal reasons such as general hardship is distinct 
from voir dire when the potential jurors are introduced to the substantive legal and factual issues of 
a defendant’s case; while the latter is a critical stage at which the defendant has a right to be present, 
the former is not). The U.S. Supreme Court has “expressly distinguished ‘voir dire’ from the 
‘administrative empanelment process.’” Id. at 888, 246 P.3d at 803 (citing Gomez v. United States, 
490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989)). 
336. State v. Rivera, 108 Wash. App. 645, 653, 32 P.3d 292, 296–97 (2001) (“This was a 
ministerial matter, not an adversarial proceeding.”). 
337. Bennett, 197 Wash. App. at 206, 275 P.3d at 1229. 
338. Koss, 158 Wash. App. at 16–17, 241 P.3d at 418. 
339. Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. at 384–85, 246 P.3d at 555–56 (2011). Ticeson was a matter of a 
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the trial judge may wish to make to counsel regarding specific conduct 
or lines of questioning may be most efficiently and fairly handled in a 
brief sidebar.340 
Sidebar conferences have an important role for the judge’s 
administrative control of the proceedings. So long as the issues are legal 
or ministerial and not adversarial, they should not be held to constitute 
closures. The practical effects of characterizing them as closures are 
significant. Trial judges would be forced to interrupt trial, perhaps 
excusing the jury to a jury room located some distance from the 
courtroom, every time she wished to address, question, or admonish 
counsel.341 The likely result—the risk of a jury exasperated by long and 
seemingly pointless delays—“would do nothing to make the trial more 
fair, to foster public trust, or to serve as a check on judges by way of 
public scrutiny.”342 
The Washington State Supreme Court should exclude sidebars and in-
chambers conferences from its definition of unconstitutional closure so 
long as their purpose is to discuss ministerial and legal matters. To 
ensure a clear record for review and emphasize the importance of 
openness, the Court can require trial courts to state for the record the 
nature and result of any sidebar discussion or chambers conferences.343 
The Court should at the same time reiterate that matters such as 
management of space, order and decorum, as long as the public has been 
accommodated as far as possible, are squarely within the trial court’s 
discretion and are not closures. 
b.  The Key Question Is Not “Is This a Trivial or De Minimis 
Closure?” but Rather “Is This a Closure at All?” 
As described above,344 the justices of the Washington State Supreme 
Court have disagreed about whether Washington courts should apply a 
“trivial” or “de minimis” closure standard. Examination of the “trivial 
closure” cases from other jurisdictions cited by Justice Madsen, 
however, suggests that most of these cases should not be characterized 
                                                     
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commitment trial, and thus was a civil, not criminal proceeding. 
However, the closure questions the court discussed were similar to those at issue in the criminal 
context. Id. at 380, 246 P.3d at 553.  
340. Id. at 386, 246 P.3d at 556. 
341. Id. at 386 n.38, 246 P.3d at 556 n.38.  
342. Id.  
343. Id. at 384, n.27, 246 P.3d at 555 n.27. 
344. See supra notes 223–51 and accompanying text.  
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as closures at all, but rather as actions within the trial court’s inherent 
discretion to manage the proceedings. These include cases in which the 
court excluded one or two persons for a specific reason,345 or briefly 
limited access for reasons of order, when the public and press had been 
largely accommodated.346 Justice Madsen’s list also included cases in 
which brief closures were inadvertent.347 An inadvertent closure is still 
error, but is arguably not a violation of the right to public trial if it 
involved no deliberate action or order denying access. A clear definition 
of what does and does not constitute a closure will make the trivial 
closure question—already inapposite under Washington law348—
unnecessary. 
2.  Whose Interest Does the Closure Aim to Protect? 
The Bone-Club test requires that the proponent of closure make some 
showing of a compelling interest.349 This Comment suggests that another 
question logically precedes the first Bone-Club factor:350 “For whose 
interest was the closure proposed?” Depending on whose interest the 
closure aims to protect, the standard of review and potential remedy for 
a violation will be different. 
                                                     
345. See, e.g., Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 91–95 (2d Cir. 2005) (exclusion of defendant’s 
mother-in-law during testimony of confidential informant); Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 917–20 
(7th Cir. 2000) (exclusion of former member of jury venire not selected as juror); State v. Lindsey, 
632 N.W.2d 652, 659-61 (Minn. 2001) (exclusion of two minors). All of these cases were cited in 
State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 183–85, 137 P.3d 825, 832–33 (2006) (Madsen, J., 
concurring). 
346. See, e.g., People v. Woodward, 841 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1992) (evaluating constitutional 
implications after bailiff locked doors and posted sign reading “Trial in progress—Please do not 
enter” and listing break times, during prosecutor’s closing argument); State v. Shaw, 619 S.W.2d 
546, 548 (Tenn. 1981) (considering order that courtroom be closed during closing arguments to 
prevent distractions from people who were arriving for judge’s daily calendar call). Both of these 
cases were cited in Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 183–84, 137 P.3d at 832–33 (Madsen, J., 
concurring). But see United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that closure 
of courtroom while jurors were questioned about safety concerns was too trivial to implicate right to 
public trial). Under Washington precedent, this would most properly be classified as a closure 
warranting a Bone-Club analysis. See, e.g., State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 230, 217 P.3d 310, 
316 (2009).  
347. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 183–84, 137 P.3d at 832–33 (Madsen, J., concurring) (citing 
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1975); Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12, 17 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983)).  
348. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
349. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325, 327–28 (1995). 
350. Id. at 258, 906 P.3d at 327. 
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a.  Under Section 22, “Likelihood of Jeopardy to Constitutional 
Rights” May Support a Closure 
According to the Ishikawa test, a closure that proposes to protect a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial need only show a likelihood of jeopardy 
to constitutional rights.351 A violation of a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, under the Sixth Amendment or Section 22, constitutes a structural 
error. Prejudice is presumed, and the appropriate remedy is a new 
trial.352 
b.  Under Section 10, a “Serious and Imminent Threat” Is Necessary 
to Support a Closure 
In cases where closure or sealing is sought to further any right or 
interest besides the defendant’s right to a fair trial, a “serious and 
imminent threat to some other important interest” must be 
demonstrated.353 Violation of the Section 10 rights of the public, without 
more, will not require the remedy of a new trial for the defendant. It will 
likely call for some restoration of access, through reconsideration of a 
sealing order or the provision of transcripts. The Washington State 
Supreme Court has held that defendants may not waive the public’s 
Section 10 right,354 but the courts of appeals have disagreed about 
whether defendants have standing to assert Section 10 rights on their 
own behalf.355 In State v. Bennett,356 a court of appeals panel recently 
opined that the defendant’s and the public’s right to open and public 
trials includes circumstances in which the mere presence of the public 
passively contributes to the fairness of the proceedings, by “deterring 
deviations from established procedures, reminding the officers of the 
court of the importance of their functions, and subjecting judges to the 
check of public scrutiny.”357 Thus, even purely legal matters may 
                                                     
351. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 37, 640 P.2d 716, 720 (1982). 
352. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 231, 217 P.3d 310, 316 (2009) (citing Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).  
353. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at 720. 
354. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 229, 217 P.3d at 315. 
355. In re Detention of Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 381–82, 246 P.3d 550, 554 (2011) 
(rejecting approach taken in State v. Wise, 148 Wash. App. 425, 200 P.3d 266 (2009), rev. granted, 
170 Wash. 2d 1009, 236 P.3d 207 (2010), in which the court held a criminal defendant lacked third 
party standing to raise Section 10 rights). The Ticeson court stated that defendant, as a member of 
the public, is protected by Section 10. Id. 
356. 168 Wash. App. 197, 275 P.3d 1224 (2012). 
357. Id. at 204, 275 P.3d at 1228. 
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implicate the public’s and defendant’s right to public trial.358 When these 
rights have been violated in such a way as to also implicate a 
defendant’s Section 22 right to a public trial, the error is likely to be 
deemed structural, requiring the remedy of a new trial.359 
In public trial cases in Washington, juror privacy has figured 
prominently.360 Questioning in open court and public access to 
confidential questionnaires has the potential to violate the privacy of 
prospective jurors, particularly in smaller communities. A prospective 
juror explaining hardship may not wish his neighbors to know that if he 
misses a week of work for the trial, he could lose his house. A 
prospective juror in Wise,361 a trial in the superior court of rural Mason 
County, was reluctant to openly discuss the health issues that posed a 
hardship for his service.362 Prospective jurors in a small community are 
likely also to be neighbors or acquaintances. Discussing issues of 
personal financial and health hardship could be more difficult in this 
setting than in a venire of strangers in a more densely-populated county. 
Moreover, jurors in Washington State receive guarantees in court 
rules,363 in literature related to jury service,364 and in juror questionnaires 
seeking sensitive information, that any information beyond their names 
is presumed confidential.365 The record seems to indicate that judges 
                                                     
358. Id. (noting that the panel in In re Detention of Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 246 P.3d 550 
(2011), would disagree). 
359. State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 149–50, 217 P.3d 321, 325–26 (2009). 
360. See supra notes 252–98 and accompanying text. 
361. 148 Wash. App. 425, 200 P.3d 266 (2009), rev. granted, 170 Wash. 2d 1009, 236 P.3d 207 
(2010). 
362. Id. at 431, 200 P.3d at 269–70. 
363. Washington State Court Rule GR 31(j) provides:  
Individual juror information, other than name, is presumed to be private. After the conclusion 
of a jury trial, the attorney for a party, or party pro se, or member of the public, may petition 
the trial court for access to individual juror information under the control of court. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit the petitioner to have access to relevant 
information. The court may require that juror information not be disclosed to other persons. 
WASH. STATE CT. R. GR 31(j). 
364. Prospective jurors are told that if they are uncomfortable answering a question during voir 
dire, they may tell the judge, who will ask the question privately. A Juror’s Guide, WASHINGTON 
COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/resources/?fa=newsinfo_jury.jury_guide (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012). 
365. The juror questionnaires in Strode and Tarhan, for example, requested information about 
prospective jurors’ sexual histories and experiences with child sexual abuse. State v. Tarhan, 159 
Wash. App. 819, 823, 246 P.3d 580, 582–83 (2011), rev. granted, 172 Wash. 2d 1013, 259 P.3d 
1109 (2011); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 224, 217 P.3d 310, 312 (2009). The questionnaire 
in Strode stated: “Your answers will be revealed only to [counsel, the judge, her staff and the 
Clerk], each of whom are under court order to keep the information confidential and under seal.” 
Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 240, 217 P.3d at 320 (C. Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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juggling concerns such as space and privacy did not believe that they 
were closing the courtroom, or in the case of sealed jury questionnaires, 
impermissibly denying access to public records, but on the contrary 
believed they were fulfilling their responsibility to balance the interests 
of justice with the needs of their communities.366 The Washington State 
Supreme Court has not discounted concerns such as juror privacy.367 But 
the Court has reiterated that such concerns must be weighed against the 
constitutional values of public trial and open administration of justice 
before a closure is ordered.368 
Thus courts should ask “whose interest?” Then, reaching back to 
Ishikawa, courts should evaluate the purported need for closure under 
the standards of “a likelihood of jeopardy” to constitutional rights369 (for 
a closure protecting a defendant’s right to a fair trial) or a “serious and 
imminent threat”370 (for a closure to protect another interest). Courts 
must answer this question clearly on the record because it is pivotal in 
determining whether a proposed closure is justified. 
3.  Has There Been an Opportunity for Those Present to Object? 
Affording an opportunity to object to those present when the denial of 
access is proposed is the second factor in both the Ishikawa371 and Bone-
Club tests.372 A valid opportunity to object presupposes that those 
present have enough information about the proposed denial of access to 
make a reasoned judgment about whether to object.373 Giving all parties 
and the public enough information about a proposed closure and an 
opportunity to register their objections furthers the objectives of open 
courts. In the event of an objection, the court can hear and assess the 
arguments. In the event that there are no spectators or objectors, a 
frequent occurrence,374 the court should note that for the record. 
                                                     
366. State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 155–56, 217 P.3d 321, 328–29 (2009); Tarhan, 159 
Wash. App. at 827, 246 P.3d at 584–85. 
367. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 236, 217 P.3d at 318 (C. Johnson, J., dissenting). 
368. Id. at 231, 217 P.3d at 316. 
369. Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 37, 640 P.2d 716, 720 (1982). 
370. Id. 
371. Id. at 37–39, 640 P.2d at 720–21. 
372. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325, 327–28 (1995). 
373. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 38, 640 P.2d at 720.  
374. Interview with the Hon. Susan Craighead, King Cnty Superior Court Judge, in Seattle, 
Wash. (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview with the Hon. Anne Ellington, Wash. State Court of Appeals 
Judge, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 29, 2011).  
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4.  Has the Court Weighed Competing Interests of the Public and the 
Proponent of Closure? 
A trial judge must begin with a presumption of openness, and bears 
the burden of defending the public’s right to open proceedings under 
Section 10. This is the fourth Bone-Club factor.375 Public access cases 
suggest that Washington constitutional law in this area is more stringent 
than federal case law analyzing public trial and public access under the 
U.S. Constitution. Federal cases such as Waller and Presley seem merely 
to indicate the “floor” of these constitutional rights; Washington law 
requires more. First, Section 10 emphasizes the value of open 
administration of justice in language absent from the First Amendment. 
Second, the Washington State Supreme Court has argued in at least one 
decision that Section 22 may also confer greater protections on the 
accused than its federal counterpart, the Sixth Amendment.376 The fact 
that the Washington State Supreme Court, unlike many federal courts,377 
has never found a violation of the right to public trial to be trivial or de 
minimis is further evidence that the Washington State standard for 
public trial is also broader than the federal standard.378 A proposed 
closure must therefore be weighed carefully against constitutional 
interests. Washington case law in this area is congruent with Waller, 
which rejected a harmless error analysis for violations of the public trial 
right.379 Even as courts have broadened the application of the federal 
harmless error rule to include more constitutional errors, they have 
repeatedly reaffirmed that any violation of the public trial right is 
structural error.380 
5.  Has the Court Considered Alternatives to Closure? 
The third Bone-Club factor (“the proposed method . . . must be the 
                                                     
375.  Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 259, 906 P.2d at 328. 
376. State v. Irby, 170 Wash. 2d 874, 884–85, 246 P.3d 796, 801–02 (2011). The Washington 
Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, provides an explicit guaranty of right to be 
present, in “the right to appear and defend.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
377. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.  
378. See State v. Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 181 n.12, 137 P.3d 825, 831 n.12 (2006). 
379. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (“‘The harmless error rule is no way to gauge 
the great, though intangible, societal loss that flows from closing courtroom doors.” (quoting People 
v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 416 (1979))). 
380. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
468–69 (1997); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). For a helpful discussion of cases 
and standards of review in the public trial context, see generally supra Levitas, note 7.  
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least restrictive means available”)381 implies a consideration of 
alternatives, but does not specify whose responsibility it is to consider 
those alternatives. It is the court’s responsibility, and the court should 
make a record of the alternatives considered,382 which it may suggest sua 
sponte.383 This may take many forms. When a small courtroom must 
accommodate both a large venire and the public, the court can reserve a 
number of seats for the press, people personally interested in the 
proceedings, and other members of the public.384 The venire can be 
divided.385 Prospective jurors may be questioned in open court while the 
rest of the venire waits elsewhere.386 
6.  Has the Closure Been Narrowly Tailored so as to Be No Broader 
than Necessary? 
This checklist question consolidates two related Bone-Club factors.387 
A problem with many closures has been their indiscriminate breadth. 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected a closed voir dire that lasted six weeks 
in Press-Enterprise I.388 The Waller Court remanded for a new 
suppression hearing after the first one was closed for two and a half 
weeks for the sake of about seven minutes of protected recordings.389 
The Bone-Club trial court closed the courtroom for the duration of an 
officer’s pretrial testimony, without evaluating whether there were any 
less extreme alternatives.390 SHB 2348 would have decreed a blanket 
closure that sealed all public records containing the names of child 
sexual assault victims.391 The courts in cases such as Press-Enterprise I, 
                                                     
381. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325, 327–28 (1995). 
382. Presley v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 
48 (1984); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 811, 100 P.3d 291, 299 (2005); Seattle Times Co. v. 
Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 38, 640 P.2d 716, 720–21 (1982).  
383. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 520 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (suggesting redaction of transcripts in such a way as to protect the anonymity of jurors 
while making public the substance of their responses); Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 810–11, 100 P.3d 
at 298–99 (suggesting ways to address space concerns while preserving public trial right).  
384. Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 810–11, 100 P.3d at 298. 
385. Id. at 810, 100 P.3d at 298. 
386. State v. Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 917, 184 P.3d 677, 679 (2008).  
387. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325, 327–28 (1995) (“3. The 
proposed method . . . must be the least restrictive means available . . . . [and] 5. The order must be 
no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose.”). 
388. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510–11. 
389. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984).  
390. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326.  
391. Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 208–11, 848 P.2d 
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Waller, Bone-Club, Allied Newspapers, and Strode each recognized the 
validity of the interests the closure aimed to protect,392 but found the 
closures too sweeping and the concerns too broadly generalized.393 
When the court has considered alternatives and still finds closure to be 
necessary, it must ensure the closure is no broader than necessary.394 
Court records such as jury questionnaires, evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis, could be redacted so as to remove certain private information, yet 
remain accessible to the public in the interest of open administration of 
justice.395 The Waller pretrial hearing could have been closed after 
weighing interests on the record for only several hours and still protected 
the ongoing government investigation. A judge who, after weighing the 
interests in her case, decided that limited private questioning of certain 
jurors was in order, would carefully delimit the scope and duration of 
such questioning, and make her reasoning clear in specific findings. 
7.  Has the Court Made Findings Specific Enough to Support the 
Closure and Provide a Record for Review? 
The test proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise I 
and echoed in Waller required the trial court to articulate the interest 
protected by closure in findings specific enough for the reviewing court 
to find whether the closure order was properly entered.396 The 
Washington State Supreme Court emphasized in Ishikawa that these 
findings and conclusions should be specific rather than conclusory.397 
Oddly, although the all-important Bone-Club decision cited this 
provision of Ishikawa,398 the test itself, reiterated over the next seventeen 
years in dozens of Section 10 and Section 22 decisions, does not 
mention the need for specific findings.399 In many public trial/public 
                                                     
1258–61 (1993). 
392. For example, the defendant’s right to a fair trial; ongoing government investigations or 
undercover work; the privacy and protection of child victims of sexual assault; and juror privacy.  
393. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510–11; Waller, 467 U.S. at 48–49; Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 
2d at 261, 906 P.2d at 329; Allied Newspapers, 121 Wash. 2d at 211, 848 P.2d at 1261.  
394. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 259, 906 P.2d at 327–28; Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 
Wash. 2d 30, 39, 640 P.2d 716, 721 (1982). 
395. It is possible that juror guides and confidential questionnaires that stress the presumption of 
privacy are misleading on this point. Prospective jurors should be advised in clear terms that court 
records are subject to public disclosure upon petition through proper channels, but that the court 
takes responsibility for redacting information so as to protect juror privacy. 
396. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. 
397. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 38, 640 P.2d at 721.  
398. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 260, 906 P.2d at 328. 
399. Id. at 258–59, 906 P. 2d at 327–28.  
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access cases since Bone-Club, reviewing courts have cited the lack of 
findings supporting a closure as a reason they found it necessary to 
reverse a conviction.400 The findings must identify the protected interest, 
demonstrate that persons present had an opportunity to object, consider 
alternatives to closure, weigh the interests supposedly protected by the 
closure against those of the public, and demonstrate careful tailoring so 
that the closure is no broader than necessary. 
B.  Appellate Courts Should Use the Checklist to Determine the 
Correct Standard of Review and Devise Remedies Appropriate to 
the Violation 
The checklist supplies a generally applicable set of standards for 
evaluating the distinct facts of each case and will enable a reviewing 
court to devise a remedy appropriate to any violation. If the trial court’s 
action did not constitute a closure, review will be for abuse of 
discretion.401 A court abuses its discretion if the decision is based on 
untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.402 
When there has been a closure, but the trial court fails to provide an 
analysis of the open courts checklist questions, the remedy will depend 
on the violation. An improper sealing of documents, as in Tarhan, could 
require remand for reconsideration of the sealing order using the open 
courts checklist. Denial of the federal right to a public trial is among the 
rare cases in which the error is structural, with prejudice presumed.403 
The federal right to public trial applies to the states.404 Sections 10 and 
22 of the state constitution may be even more protective of the 
defendant’s, as well as the public’s, rights.405 A majority of the 
Washington State Supreme Court has consistently held—unlike the 
federal courts—that there is no de minimis violation of the right to 
                                                     
400. See, e.g., State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 228, 217 P.3d 310, 314–15 (2009); State v. 
Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 506, 518, 122 P.3d 150, 156 (2005); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 
811–12, 100 P.3d 291, 299 (2005); Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 45, 640 P.2d at 724; State v. Paumier, 
155 Wash. App. 673, 685, 230 P.3d 212, 219 (2010), rev. granted, 169 Wash. 2d 1017, 236 P.3d 
206 (2010). 
401. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 96–97, 257 P.3d 624, 630 (2011).  
402. State v. Suttle, 61 Wash. App. 703, 710, 812 P.2d 119, 123 (1991). 
403. Presley v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722–25 (2010); Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984); Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 
231, 217 P.3d at 316 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)); State v. Momah, 167 
Wash. 2d 140, 156, 217 P.3d 321, 329 (2009). 
404. Presley, 130 S. Ct. at 723.  
405. See supra notes 377–80 and accompanying text. 
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public trial.406 When this constitutional right has been violated, as it was 
in Wise and Paumier, the remedy is reversal and remand: for a new trial, 
or for a new suppression hearing, as in Waller;407 or for reconsideration 
of a sealing order, as in Tarhan.408 As a manifest constitutional error, it 
may be noticed for the first time on appeal.409 A defendant may waive 
this right, as he or she may waive other constitutional rights, but waiver 
must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”410 The defendant cannot 
waive the public’s right to open proceedings under Section 10.411 
CONCLUSION 
Washington has a robust open courts jurisprudence based primarily 
on state law, which is more protective of the rights of the public and the 
accused than is federal law. There is persistent disagreement on the 
Washington State Supreme Court about the extent of the differences 
between state and federal law, and this continuing disagreement has 
contributed to uncertainty among trial courts. A court employing an 
effective open courts checklist will first answer the threshold question of 
what is, and is not, a closure; this will eliminate from the closure 
analysis matters properly in the trial court’s discretion. The court will 
then weigh the constitutional rights and other interests at stake, and be 
able to narrowly tailor any necessary closure or sealing. The court will 
make specific findings based on the checklist, which will enable 
effective review on appeal. In this way, Washington courts will be able 
to preserve the value of openness, the “soul of justice” enshrined in our 
constitution, while still addressing the daily flesh-and-blood concerns of 
trial courts across the state. 
 
                                                     
406. See supra notes 240–51 and accompanying text. 
407. Waller, 467 U.S. at 50. 
408. State v. Tarhan, 159 Wash. App. 819, 821, 246 P.3d 580, 582 (2011), rev. granted, 172 
Wash. 2d 1013, 259 P.3d 1109 (2011).  
409. Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.5 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Errors Raised for First Time on Review. The appellate court may refuse to review any 
claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the 
following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: (1) lack of trial court 
jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and (3) manifest 
error affecting a constitutional right.  
R. APP. P. 2.5(a); see also State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229, 217 P.3d 310, 315 (2009). 
410. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 229 n.3, 217 P.3d at 315 n.3 (explaining that right to public trial is 
protected in same constitutional provision as right to trial by jury, and so can likewise be waived 
only in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner).  
411. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
